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SUMMARY
The principles and characteristics of peacekeeping, as the United Nations (UN)
in its search towards global peace and stability originally intended, are not
adhered to in Sub-Saharan African countries. In this context, peacekeeping
operations are perceived to be synonymous with biased armed intervention and
the enforcement of peace through the application of force, often without the
consent of the parties involved in conflict.
As the political situation in many Sub-Saharan African states deteriorates, a
greater need for peacekeeping and even peace enforcement operations has
arisen. Mounting pressure on South Africa from regional forces, as well South
Africa's own national interest to become involved in peacekeeping, calls for an
evaluation of 'Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping' per se. This situation creates
a dilemma as regards both the responses by regional organs and the reaction of
states to the endemic and escalating conflicts in collapsing states. Can what is
currently happening in Sub-Saharan African still be referred to as
peacekeeping? Do we need a fresh approach to conflict resolution in Sub-
Saharan Africa? Are the UN principles, set in a post-World War " global
context, still applicable in a deteriorating intra-state context?
In an attempt to find answers to these questions, this research focuses on the
nature of peacekeeping operations from an analytical, comparative perspective
with the aim of identifying commonalities and differences in the approaches and
practices of countries that have participated in peacekeeping operations. Could
it be that 'classical' UN peacekeeping has simply become historically outdated
and that modern peacekeeping operations are dictated by the socio-political
environment and thus requires a new approach? It would appear that the
concept of peacekeeping needs to be re-defined from an African perspective in
order to equip regional organs with a firm theoretical foundation for possible
future involvement in Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping and peace
enforcement endeavours.
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The UN's peacekeeping performance on the African continent over the past
decade has raised serious doubts as to whether the UN has the capacity or will
to deal effectively with inter-state and more specifically, intra-state conflict.
Consequently, Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping is currently standing at a
crossroad. It is also evident that a transition needs to be made from 'classical'
UN peacekeeping principles to a 'modern' African approach in touch with
Africa's prevailing circumstances and demands.
From the research findings and case studies, a conclusion is drawn concerning
how 'modern' peacekeeping practices compare to 'classical' peacekeeping, as
envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In addition, a model is proposed for
dealing with the unique challenges of Sub-SaharanAfrican intra-state conflict.
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OPSOMMING
Die beginsels en kenmerke van vredebewaring, soos die Verenigde Nasies (VN)
in sy soeke na wêreldvrede en stabiliteit oorspronklik beoog het, word nie in
Afrika suid van die Sahara eerbiedig nie. In die konteks, word vredebewarings-
operasies geag as sinoniem te wees met partydige gewapende inmenging en
die afdwing van vrede deur die aanwending van mag, dikwels sonder die
toestemming van diegene wat in die konflik betrokke is.
Die verslegtende politieke situasie in vele lande in Afrika suid van die Sahara
bring mee dat 'n groter behoefte bestaan vir vredebewaring en selfs operasies
om vrede af te dwing. Toenemende druk op Suid-Afrika deur streeksmagte
sowel as Suid-Afrika se eie nasionale belang om by vredebewaring in Afrika
betrokke te raak, noodsaak juis 'n evaluasie van vredebewaring in Afrika suid
van die Sahara. Hierdie situasie veroorsaak 'n dilemma in sover dit die reaksie
betref van streeksorganisasies sowel as dié van mislukkende state wat
toenemend by inheemse konflik betrokke raak. Kan dit wat tans in Afrika suid
van die Sahara aan die gebeur is steeds beskou word as vredebewaring? Word
'n nuwe benadering tot die beslegting van inheemse konflik in Afrika suid van
die Sahara vereis? Is die VN beginsels soos gestel binne 'n globale na-tweede-
wêreld-oorlogse konteks steeds van toepassing op 'n verslegtende intra-staat
konflik konteks?
In 'n poging om antwoorde te vind op dié vrae, fokus die navorsing op die aard
van vredebewaringsoperasies vanuit 'n analitiese, vergelykende perspektief.
Hierdie fokus het ten doelom ooreenkomste en verskille in die benaderings tot
en toepassings van vrede in lande wat aan vredebewaringsoperasies
deelgeneem het, te identifiseer. Is dit dalk moontlik dat 'klassieke'
vredebewaring histories verouderd is en dat 'moderne'
vredebewaringsoperasies deur die sosio-politiese omgewing dikteer word en as
sulks, 'n nuwe benadering vereis? Dit wil voorkom asof die konsep van
vredebewaring vanuit 'n Afrika perspektief her-definieer behoort te word sodat
streeksorganisasies toegerus kan word met stewige teoretiese grondbeginsels
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vwaarop toekomstige vredebewaringsoperasies in Afrika suid van die Sahara
gebaseer kan word.
Die VN se vertoning in die bewaring van vrede en meer spesifiek, dié se
vertoning die afgelope dekade, laat ernstige twyfelontstaan oor dié organisasie
se vermoë of wil om effektief met konflik binne en tussen state te handel. As
gevolg hiervan, bevind Afrika suid van die Sahara haar by 'n kruispad wat die
bewaring van vrede aanbetref. Dit is ook duidelik dat daar 'n verskuiwing
behoort plaas te vind vanaf 'klassieke' vredebewaringsbeginsels na 'n meer
'moderne' Afrika benadering wat in pas is met Afrika se eiesoortige
omstandighede en eise.
Vanuit die navorsingsbevindinge en gevallestudies word daar in die
gevolgtrekkings gekyk in hoe 'n mate 'moderne' vredebewaring in die praktyk
met 'klassieke' vredebewaring, soos beoog in Hoofstuk VI van die VN Handves,
vergelyk. Aansluitend hierby, word 'n model voorgestel vir die hantering van die
intra-staat vraagstukke wat voortspruit uit konflik binne state in Afrika suid van
die Sahara.
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If war is the.fallure of diplomacy, then ... diplomacy, both bilateral and
multilateral, is our first line...of defence. The world today spends
billions preparinq for war; shouldn't we spend a billion or two
preparing for peace?
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
The stark and inescapable fact-Is that today we cannot defend our
society by war, since total war is total destruction, .and if war is used
as an instrument of policy, eventually we will have total war.
Therefore, the best defence of peace is not power, but the removal of
the causes of war, and international agreements which will put peace
on a stronger foundation than the terror of destruction.... The grim
fact, however, is that we prepare for war like precocious giants and
for-peace likeretarded pygmies....
l..ester B. Pearson (On accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, 1957)
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1CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
1.1 Introduction
Peacekeeping is a global occurrence, which has increasingly become
prevalent on the African continent, as well as in Europe, the Middle East and
the Americas. Since the demise of the Cold War, a steady increase in
peacekeeping operations has been observed. Evident, however, is the
inconsistent manner in which peacekeeping operations are being conducted
in the Nineties in relation to the manner in which they were conducted before.
The controversial nature of this global phenomenon calls for a re-examination
of peacekeeping practices, principles, its operational nature and character.
In the Sub-Saharan African context, the concept and conduct of peacekeeping
operations are often confused with concepts, such as 'peace enforcement',
'peacemaking', 'peacebuilding', 'conflict intervention' and 'conflict resolution'.
Peacekeeping operations are perceived to be synonymous with armed
intervention and the enforcement of peace through the application of force,
often without the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it
would appear that peacekeepers often allow their impartiality to take a
backseat.
The first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations endeavoured to
monitor and supervise peace agreements, cease-fires and truces. These
operations were known as Chapter VI operations as contained in Article 33 of
the UN Charter. In essence, Article 33 mandates operations that aim to settle
disputes in a peaceful manner. Such UN operations are based on three
principles: The consent of the parties involved, the impartiality of the
peacekeepers and the absence of force. However, the 'classical' UN intention
and aim of peacekeeping are being misinterpreted in their application to
modern inter-state, and intra-state conflict situations, especially as regards
operations conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, Malan notes that
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to traditional blue helmet operations, which are conducted with li ••• consent,
impartiality and without resort to force" (1998a: 1).
The reality of modern peacekeeping operations is characterised by a number
of activities, suggesting that the concept of peacekeeping is a misnomer in
need of clarification and even re-definition. A disregard of peace agreements
and a lack of commitment to treaties by warring parties, often result in
unsuccessful peace initiatives and a threat to the safety of peacekeepers. On
a number of occasions peacekeeping endeavours have resulted in casualties
among the participants of the peacekeeping operation, which suggests that
the principles of UN peacekeeping are not being upheld. It is also evident that
an increased tendency to apply force and threats to use force are part and
parcel of these so-called 'modern' peacekeeping operations. More often than
none, this inability to adhere to peacekeeping principles results in escalating
violence, human casualties, the displacement of citizens and a deteriorating
conflict situation.
As a causal factor for outside intervention, conflict needs to be evaluated in
terms of its fundamental nature, the reasons for its presence and the
devastating effect it has on the populace of a particular country. Owing to a
lack of understanding and training, peacekeepers often fail to control conflict
of ethnic origin. In this regard, the genocide in Rwanda and Somalia, during
which the shortcomings of UN peacekeepers in dealing with ethnic intra-state
violence were exposed, comes to mind. Africa is particularly prone to
instances of intra-state conflict, where ethnic factions and the disregard for
cease-fires and peace treaties constantly threaten the lives of locals and even
peacekeepers.
This research project was prompted by the characteristic inconsistency of
Sub-Saharan Africa peacekeeping operations and the unnecessary loss of
life, which has become a trademark of recent peacekeeping operations. The
experiences of two African countries in their dealings with intra-state conflict
situations and the subsequent deployment of troops from Southern African
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3Development Community (SADC) member countries under the banner of
'peacekeeping' form the focal point of this study. In order to explore and
ultimately suggest a remedy for this problematical phenomenon, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Republic of Lesotho have been
selected as case studies. The reason for selecting these two countries is the
fact that these are the most recent examples of operations conducted in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
1.2 Motivation for Research Project
The practice of peacekeeping, in terms of its 'classical' meaning and what is
actually taking place at an increasingly alarming rate in Sub-Saharan Africa,
are worlds apart. What used to be noble acts of goodwill, seem to be 'war'
disguised and executed under the pretence of peacekeeping and sinister so-
called 'national interests'. The impression is also being created that countries
participating in peacekeeping operations are reluctant to become involved or
to render greater material and/or logistical support when the success rate of
an operation is perceived to be low or doubtful.
As the political situation in many Sub-Saharan African states deteriorates, a
greater need for such operations may arise. Mounting pressure on South
Africa by regional forces, as well South Africa's own national interest to
become involved in peacekeeping, calls for an evaluation of Sub-Saharan
African peacekeeping per se. This evaluation, together with an investigation
into the different disguises of peacekeeping, shortcomings in addressing
ethnic inter-state and intra-state conflict and the factors giving rise to its
necessity, are the driving forces motivating this research project.
The researcher aims to evaluate the intervention under the banner of
peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of
Lesotho, by comparing it to 'classical' peacekeeping as epitomised by the
United Nations. Can what is currently happening in Sub-Saharan Africa still
be called peacekeeping? Do we need a fresh approach to conflict resolution
in Sub-Saharan Africa? Should African states solve their own internal
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4problems. and should outsiders be permitted to intervene? If intervention is
selected as an option, how should it be conducted? In search of answers to
these pressing questions, this research project sets out to find solutions to an
increasingly prevalent and destructive phenomenon.
1.3 Objectivesof ResearchProject
This research project has a number of objectives. One of these is to
determine the most viable theoretical approach whereby the Sub-Saharan
African peacekeeping phenomenon can be analysed. To accomplish this
objective, a policy content analysis approach, with a comparative analysis as
analytical focus will be pursued. This will be done in Chapter 2.
A second objective is to examine the nature of conflict and the management
thereof. This examination will enable this researcher to examine 'classical'
peacekeeping policy in terms of its theory and practice with the aim of
comparing it to the 'modern' peacekeeping theory and practice. The analytical
focus will therefore be on the United Nations Charter (specifically Chapters VI
and VII), in terms of which comparisons will be drawn to Sub-Saharan African
peacekeeping implementation practices and theories. To achieve this goal,
two Sub-Saharan African examples (The Democratic Republic of the Congo
[DRC] and the Republic of Lesotho) will be used as case studies. The second
objective will be dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4.
A third objective is to propose a conflict-intervention and conflict-resolution
model in view of the increased reliance on peace enforcement and armed
conflict intervention as an evidently Sub-Saharan African option to resolving
volatile conflict situations. The proposed model, which aims to fill the hiatus in
an emerging peace enforcement paradigm, is described in Chapter 5.
A fourth objective is to ensure a coherent product. This objective will be
achieved by ensuring that linkages are established between the various
chapters in order to provide for a systematic progression from one theme to
the other. In the chapters of this research project the aim is to build on the
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central theme will culminate in Chapter 6, in which a number of
recommendations shall be made on the way forward for African conflict and
the resolution thereof.
1.4 Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis
The principles and characteristics of peacekeeping as the United Nations, in
its pursuit of global peace and stability, originally intended are not being
adhered to in Sub-Saharan African countries. The reasons for this
inconsistency are numerous and range from the evident inexperience of
participants in peacekeeping operations to a lack of consent, breaches of
impartiality and the utilisation of force when dealing with such situations. The
apparent misconception is that peace will be attained through violent means.
Other reasons include the unique nature and history of ethnic violence; the
remnants of a historical (colonial) era in especially border demarcation and
the escalation of inter-state and intra-state conflict.
When dealing with conflict, peacekeeping is usually employed to prevent the
escalation of the conflict and to limit casualties. However, peacekeeping has
proved to be a fatal misconception, since if peacekeeping is not practised in
accordance with its guiding principles (consent, impartiality and without force),
it can never be the ultimate tool for resolving conflict situations. In fact, it often
contributes to the deterioration of situations, since parties to the conflict forfeit
the principles of consent and impartiality and ultimately resort to the use of
force in order to save face and to maintain the status quo. It seems, however,
that enforcement action aimed at stabilising an already volatile situation is, in
some instances, a more viable option, but is inconsistent in terms of its
mandate and modus operandi. Possible reasons for these enforcement
operations are the reluctance of the UN to become involved and the notion
that African conflict needs an African solution.
Owing to the constraints of this research paper, the intention of this
researcher is to review present peacekeeping implementation practices as
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African case studies will be presented. Given the nature of the research
problem, the following hypothesis was formulated with the aim of establishing
why peacekeeping operations are being conducted in their current manner.
Research Hypothesis
The research hypothesis maintained in this research paper is the following:
The current Sub-Saharan African practice of resolving conflict is inconsistent
with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the absence
of force.
1.5 Research Methodology
This research will focus on the nature of peacekeeping operations from an
analytical and comparative perspective with the aim of identifying
commonalities and differences in the conduct of countries participating in
peacekeeping operations. In support of this methodology, a section on policy
theory (Chapter 2) will be included to cover the theoretical premise of this
research project. The practices of African peacekeepers will be examined to
determine why peacekeeping operations have evolved to the extent currently
evident. Could it be that 'classical' UN peacekeeping has simply become
historically outdated and that modern peacekeeping operations are dictated
by the socio-political environment and thus require a new approach?
It is evident, therefore, that the current nature of peacekeeping will be the
main focus and evidence in support of this focus will be obtained through a
quantitative review of literature pertaining to the identified countries. In turn,
these literature will be evaluated against the blueprint of what is commonly
referred to as, 'classical' peacekeeping. The unstable and volatile political
environment of the countries falling within the scope of this research will
provide the context for it. This context will also be analysed to establish
causal linkages in terms of the reasons for and failure of Sub-Saharan African
peacekeeping operations. From the research findings a conclusion will be
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peacekeeping, as envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
A variety of techniques will be explored during the research process to ensure
that valid arguments form the basis of sound conclusions. A thorough search
will be conducted concerning literature on the concepts and related
terminology of peacekeeping in order to acquaint the reader with the different
concepts prevailing in peacekeeping jargon. A quantitative and qualitative
literature collection process will be followed concerning the case studies of
both the DRC and the Lesotho Republic to establish the causes of conflict, the
nature of the peacekeeping operations and the need for intervention. In both
case studies, the research will be supplemented by thorough media searches.
The research will be both deductive and inductive, as it will be based on both
primary and secondary data sources that suggest a fresh look at the nature of
peacekeeping. The focus will therefore specifically fall on peacekeeping
practices in the Sub-Saharan African context. The main focus of this research
document will be a comparative analysis of 'classical' peacekeeping and
'modern' (African) peacekeeping principles and practices. The ultimate aim of
the researcher is to propose a conflict-intervention and conflict-resolution
model that could perhaps aid attempts to resolve intra-state and inter-state
conflict in a 'modern' and evolving continental peacekeeping paradigm.
1.6 Clarification of Concepts
In order to understand and contextualise peacekeeping and related concepts
referred to in the research, clarification of certain key concepts is deemed
necessary. The following concepts are therefore clarified:
1.6.1 Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping involves the use of armed forces to
maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic/political solution for a
specific conflict situation. According to Mboma (1995:115) peacekeeping can
be defined as, ''mhe prevention, containment, moderation and termination of
hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third
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forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."
Chipman, in citing Marrack Gouldlnq's' textbook definition of peacekeeping,
defines it as:
"Field Operations, established by the United Nations, with consent of the
parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under
United Nations Command and Control, at the expense collectively of the
member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided
voluntarily by them acting impartially between the parties and using force to
the minimum extent necessary" (1995: 11).
The UN Secretary-General defines peacekeeping in its 'Agenda for Peace', as
"[T]he deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the
consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a
technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and
the making of peace" (Gumbi, 1995:28). The United States Defence Force
distinguishes between traditional and aggravated peacekeeping. 'Traditional'
peacekeeping refers to, "the deployment of a UN, regional organisation, or a
coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned,
normally involving UN regional organisations, or coalition military forces,
and/or police and civilians". 'Aggravated' peacekeeping is undertaken with
"... minimal consent of all belligerents parties, but which are complicated by
intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, ...peacekeeping forces are
authorised to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the mission they are
assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an
existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts ... or supporting or
safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts" (Gumbi, 1995:29). It is evident from
these definitions that the principles of peacekeeping are to be upheld as far as
possible with only slight deviation permitted in certain instances. Also
important, is that peacekeeping is dependent on a commitment by the willing
and able.
IA former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
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91.6.2 PeaceEnforcement: Peace-enforcement refers to peace operations
conducted without the consent of one or more parties concerning one or more
aspects of, or concerning the entire UN mandate. Peace-enforcement action
takes place under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and involves the use of
military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. Such means may
include dealing with an inter-state or internal conflict situation to meet a
humanitarian need or when state institutions have largely collapsed (Gumbi,
1995:29; Cilliers, 1995:58). Shelton (1997:13) refers to it as, li[T}hethreat or
use of force to restore or maintain peace", whilst it is defined by Williams as,
li[T}he purposeful use of military force as sanctioned by the UN Security
Council to either deter or counter unlawful aggression by one country against
another" (Williams, 1996:27-29). Peace enforcement operations often fall
outside the scope of UN command and control capabilities. Such operations
often bear the label of unilateral action, since they are conducted in coalition
or with the endorsement of organisations, such as the UN, the Organisation
for African Unity (OAU) and even the SADC. The operation of (SADC) forces
in Lesotho is a classical example of a peace enforcement operation.
1.6.3 Peacebuilding: Cilliers defines peacebuilding as, "[pJost conflict
action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and
solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to contiier (1995:58).
Peacebuilding mechanisms include the identification and support of structures
that will consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being
and support economic reconstruction, which may involve the military and
civilians. According to Kofi Annan, the current Secretary-General of the UN,
Ii••• peacebuilding involves integrated and coordinated actions aimed at
addressing the root causes of violence-whether political, legal, institutional,
military, humanitarian, human-right related, environmental economic and
social, cultural or demographic." (1998:21). This activity normally takes place
after peace has been restored and is thus regarded as a long-term conflict-
prevention strategy.
1.6.4 Peacemaking: According to the UN, peacemaking is, Ii ••• actions to
bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such means as
..... ..,
IJ. S.
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foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations". (Gumbi,
1995:28). Peacemaking involves the deployment of diplomats and politicians
to achieve a negotiated settlement in a conflict situation prior to or even after
the commitment of a peacekeeping force. Other skills employed include
persuasion, mediation, non-military coercion (which may consist of diplomatic
isolation and sanctions), multi-lateral discussions and conciliation.
Peacemaking usually takes place after conflict has erupted and aims at
establishing a peaceful settlement. The Lusaka Agreement (signed in July
1999 between the conflicting parties in the DRC) is an example of a
peacemaking initiative brokered by politicians and diplomats.
1.6.5 Conflict Intervention: Conflict intervention refers to the actions of a
third party intervening in a situation where at least two warring factions are
engaged in hostile acts against each other. The ultimate objective is to
establish peace by forceful or peaceful means. The concept of conflict
intervention is closely linked to conflict prevention, which includes activities
ranging from diplomatic initiatives to the deployment of troops in order to
prevent further hostilities. According to Dobbie (1994: 124), conflict
intervention includes early warning, surveillance, stabilising measures and
preventative deployment. It may also include fact-finding missions,
consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring.
1.6.6 Armed Intervention: Armed intervention refers to conflict
intervention, which involves the threat to use and the actual use of force in
order to stabilise an already volatile situation. In most conflict stricken regions
in Africa, armed intervention often takes place unilaterally and under the guise
of peacekeeping - often without UN sanction.
The following three concepts constitute the foundation upon which 'classical'
peacekeeping is founded. At this juncture it is only briefly conceptualised to
provide a general orientation, since a more comprehensive discussion follows
in Chapter 3.
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1.6.7 Consent: Consent is viewed as one of the cornerstones of
peacekeeping, together with impartiality and the absence of force. It is
defined by Malan (1997:18) as, "[T]he reaching of agreement, the granting of
permission or approval by parlies to the conflict ... it is given and may also be
withdrawn".
1.6.8 Impartiality: The impartiality of a military force intervening in a
conflict situation is of cardinal importance to ensure that the trust and
confidence of the disputing parties is maintained. In order to ensure
impartiality, any force established to intervene in a conflict situation must be a
multi-national one and must be represented as broadly as possible. Malan
(1997:25) simply defines impartiality as, "...[the] absence of bias".
1.6.9 Absence of Force: Peacekeeping is based on the premise that all
peaceful methods shall at all times be explored to establish lasting peace.
However, this is not always possible, even though it may be desirable. The
absence of force therefore implies the pacific resolution of conflict. The pacific
resolution of conflict may include negotiation, mediation, arbitration and other
peaceful means. Williams (1996:28) refer to the absence of force as
"restraint".
1.7 Conclusion
Western powers are seemingly disengaging from peacekeeping in Africa as a
result of a number of factors that will become evident in this research paper.
This western approach results in a situation whereby Sub-Saharan African
countries involved in intra-state and inter-state conflict appear to have been
left to their own perilous devices, which suggests that they themselves need
to sort out their own internal problems. The Western powers are keen to
support training initiatives that may contribute to strengthening Africa's own
capabilities to deal with conflict situations. However, they are reluctant to
engage in peacekeeping operations themselves when the lives of outsiders
are perceived to be placed at risk. Should this be the case in future, then
every effort must be made to ensure that Sub-Saharan African states will be
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able to intervene with multi-national forces committed by the region for the
region.
Lasting peace, (something that has evaded the region for decades) is a
continental requirement for political stability and economic development and
peacekeeping or even peace enforcement is a vehicle for achieving this.
Consequently, the concept of peacekeeping needs to be re-defined from an
African perspective in order to equip regional organs such as the SADC and
OAU with a firm theoretical foundation for possible future involvement in Sub-
Saharan African peacekeeping endeavours. Within this melting pot of
approaches to and practices of peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations, a solution that will suit Africa's needs must be found.
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CHAPTER2
GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
Since the objectives outlined in Chapter 1 require a general orientation in
terms of the theory of policy analysis, the focus of this chapter will be on
discussing the methodological approaches to analysis and on selecting and
discussing an appropriate analytical focus and approach. The selected
approach will be used to contextualise and guide the thought-processes and
research required for this paper.
2.2 Methodological Approaches to Policy Analysis
Policy analysis is a contentious issue. The main reason for this seems to be
disagreement on what exactly constitutes this discipline. In this chapter the
intention is not to become involved in an academic debate concerning the
merits and demerits of policy studies, but rather to provide a brief overview of
the different approaches that various scholars have adopted in their quest to
address the issue of policy analysis. This chapter will therefore focus on the
theoretical approaches to policy analysis and on selecting an appropriate
theoretical application. The selected theoretical approach will provide the
fundamental theoretical linkage to the research in support of the methodology.
The aim of this chapter is thus:
• to construct a broad framework by describing what policy, public policy,
policy analysis and comparative policy constitute;
• to describe the analytical approach, focus and instruments of comparative
policy analysis; and
• to select an appropriate policy application that can be employed as a
structural component and theoretical point of departure for the research.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
14
2.2.1 Policy
The concept "policy" has various denotations. These range from the broadest
everyday denotations, such as its reference to "a government's economic
policy" to its reference to policy as a "programme, output, outcome, theory or
model" (Hagwood and Gunn, 1984:13-24). In an attempt to define the
concept of policy, Fox and Meyer (1995:96) state that policy is "a guide of
action or statement of goals that should be followed in an institution to deal
with a particular problem or phenomenon". Furthermore, they propose that
policy should be regarded as, "a guide to action ... to provide consistency of
decisions" and as, "goals and objectives within a given situation and the
methods to realise them". Koenig (1986:2) supports this view when he states
that policy is, ".. .incremental ... " and "...a long-term rather than a short-term
guide of action". Dunn (1994:33) relates the term "policy" to the Middle
English word "policie", which refers to, "the conduct of public affairs or the
administration of government". What is evident from the cited definitions is
that policy entails a proposed action by an institution such as a government
and such action is aimed at achieving a desired outcome.
2.2.2 Public Policy
Two key concepts are related to policy. One is the environment in which we
live and the other is the problems generated by it. The problems stemming
from environmental factors result in a need for policy. Policies thus originate
in response to societal phenomena. Such responses may be focused on any
level of society. For example, in the case of a national crime prevention
strategy, the policy to effect such a strategy will have a national focus,
whereas a policy to address the theft of bicycles will have a local focus
confined to specific areas where the incidence of theft is high. The aim of
such a policy will thus be to achieve a decrease in the theft of bicycles. In this
regard, Hecla, as cited by Koenig (1986:2), defines public policy as, "a course
of action intended to accomplish some end".
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Public policies should be viewed as formal expressions (legislation, executive
orders, rules and regulations) of decisions, choices made and actions taken in
response to societal phenomena. Dunn's definition of public policy as a,
It••• Iong series of more or less related choices (including decisions not to act)
made by government bodies and officials" support this particular view
(1994:70). Fox and Meyer (1995:107) define public policy as, "authoritative
statements made by legitimate public institutions about the way in which they
propose to deal with policy problems". Dye (1976:1) simply defines public
policy as, "...whatever government choose to do or not to do". The
significance of public policies lies in its reference to action by some institution
to effect an intended change of the status quo. One important aspect to
realise is that policies require adaptation, because no two environments or
sets of circumstances are identical.
2.2.3 PolicyAnalysis
No single definition of policy analysis exists. This is evident if one considers
the vast number of definitions contained in literature. One well-known
definition of policy analysis is offered by Dye when he defines it as, "finding
out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes"
(1976:1). In his view, essentially all definitions of policy analysis are the
description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government
action. Ham and Hill (1984:13) put forward a seemingly narrower view of
policy analysis when they write that, " [a]ctions as well as decisions may
therefore be said to be the proper focus of policy analysis". In defining policy
analysis, Dunn (1994:84) offers a more comprehensive definition. He defines
it as 'Ta]n applied social science discipline that uses multiple methods of
inquiry in contexts of argumentation and public debate, to create, critically
assess, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge". This definition
accentuates the practical nature of policy analysis as, "...a response to
recurrent problems and crisis facing governments" (Dunn 1994:62). The lack
of a single definition should be regarded as a positive rather than a negative
consequence, as one single definition would not have done justice to the
diverse nature and scope of policy analysis.
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2.2.4 ComparativePolicy Analysis
The objective of this research project is to draw a comparison between
traditional UN peacekeeping principles and African peacekeeping practices.
In order to provide insight into the art of comparative policy analyses, it is
necessary to clarify what this concept constitutes. Before attempting to define
this concept, the objectives of comparative analyses need to be considered.
According to Hitchner and Levine (1981:5) three objectives can be
distinguished, namely
• to develop a verifiable body of knowledge on government and politics in
general;
• to evaluate political experience, institutions, behaviour and processes in
terms of cause and effect and desirability and undesirability; and to
• ultimately be able to predict events, tendencies and consequences.
The value of comparison is emphasised by Hague and Harrop (1987:15) in
their view of comparison as, "... the foundation of any systematic branch of
knowledge". They assert that, "...causal relationships should always be
analysed by comparing situations where given factors are present with those
where they are absent". In reference to the preceding postulations of what
comparative policy analysis is and should be, comparative policy analysis may
be viewed as the study of how, why and to what effect various governments
pursue particular courses of action or inaction.
2.2.5 Approaches to Policy Analysis
In an attempt to contextualise this research project, it is necessary to review
the different approaches to policy analysis in a broad context. For this
purpose, the approaches to policy analysis will be explained by means of a
model. Figure 1 represents a summary by Wissink (1988:75) of the different
approaches, analytical foci and analytical instruments that may be employed
as points of departure in the study of policy analysis. As mentioned in the
preceding section, the objective with the inclusion of this model is firstly to
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contextualise the various approaches to policy analysis, secondly to describe
and select an appropriate approach, focus and instrument as analytical basis.
The selected approach, focus and instruments will provide the framework
within which peacekeeping and its related concepts will be analysed.
FIGURE 1: APPROACHES TO POLICY ANALYSIS
ANALYTICAL ANALYTICAL ANALYTICAL
APPROACH FOCUS INSTRUMENTS
Policy Content Policy Interpretation Judicial practice
Analysis Studies Administrative law
Comparative Policy Correlation of policy
Analysis content
Policy Dynamics Indicators of policy change
Policy Pathology Problems and ailments ofthe policy process
Policy System Policy Behavioural Influence, decisions of
Analysis Studies shareholders and actors
Policy Institutional Role of institutions and
Studies organisations
Policy Process Agenda-setting procedures
Studies of policy-making bodies andcommittees
Policy Issue Analysis Policy Problem The objective nature of
Structuring public problems
Policy Advocacy Recommended policyalternatives
Policy Outcome The outcome of policy
Analysis Policy Monitoring actions
Policy Impact The value of policy actionsEvaluation
Source: Wissink (1988:75)
When examining the highlighted sections (see Figure 1), it is evident that the
analytical approach to this research project constitutes a policy content
analysis. The analytical focus has a dual purpose, as firstly it seeks to
analyse the content of peacekeeping policy and secondly it provides the
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framework within which historic peacekeeping policies can be compared with
current practices. In terms of the scope of this research project, the policies
and practices of traditional UN peacekeeping will be compared to the
practices of African peacekeeping. The instrument of analysis will be a
correlational study of the policy content of UN peacekeeping principles and
African peacekeeping practices. The aim is to empirically verify the
deductions and conclusions of the research findings by correlating these to
currently prevalent manifestations.
The comparative approach in this research project attempts to gain a deeper
understanding of peacekeeping policies by explaining why a need exists for
this global practice and to propose a procedure for dealing with the causes
and consequences of conflict
Closely linked to policy analysis, is the policy-formulation process. From as
early as 1956 (Laswell) through to 1970 and 1980 (Brewer, Jones and
Anderson), scholars have developed various models in an attempt to explain
the policy-formulation process (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995:10-11). A
particularly useful model in support of the objective of this research project
and one that may have value in dealing with intra-state conflict is the one put
forward by these authors. The model they propose (Figure 2), contain the
various policy stages and reflect its relationship to applied problem-solving.
FIGURE 2: FIVE STAGES OF THE POLICY CYCLE AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO APPLIED PROBLEM-SOLVING
PHASES OF APPLIED PROBLEM-SOLVING STAGES IN THE POLICY CYCLE
1. Problem Recognition 1. Agenda Setting
2. Proposal of Solution 2. Policy Formulation
3. Choice of Solution 3. Decision-Making
4. Putting Solution into Effect 4. Policy Implementation
5. Monitoring Results 5. Policy Evaluation
Source: Howlett and Ramesh (1995:11)
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2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter a theoretical framework is outlined which aims at setting the
tone for a discussion (in the forthcoming chapters) of the issues relating to the
nature of peacekeeping. Policy issues differ widely, and each one requires a
unique approach. The approach, focus and instruments selected in this
chapter will provide the structural components for a comparative analysis of
the context of Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping and the 'classical' UN
context of peacekeeping in terms of their historical-political setting, causal
factors and outcomes. In Chapter 5 a conflict-intervention and conflict-
resolution model is proposed, which is founded on a problem-solving
approach to conflict.
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CHAPTER3
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEKEEPING
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, the methodological approaches to policy are discussed in order
to contextualise the comparative policy approach adopted for this research
project. The aim of this chapter is not fa define the various peacekeeping
concepts used by so many scholars in modern peacekeeping literature (this is
done in Chapter 1), but to contextualise peacekeeping per se. In this chapter
peacekeeping is viewed in its wider context and encompasses all the related
concepts already explained.
The contextualisation of peacekeeping is necessary because, as Cilliers
(1999:20) observes, 'Tt]he concept of peacekeeping was designed to deal with
conflict between states and not with internal conflict in countries". What we
increasingly observe in Africa, however, is that the peacekeeping playing
fields are not level and the rules of the peacekeeping 'game' have undergone
major changes over the last decade of this century. These changes are
evident if one considers the global difference in the various practices and
approaches to peacekeeping. The nature of inter-state and intra-state conflict
on especially the African continent requires a different approach to what is
commonly known as 'classical' or 'blue helmet' peacekeeping operations. The
preferred option is that UN peacekeeping operations be based on the
principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force.
One could argue that African circumstances dictate an approach, where the
emphasis on keeping the peace needs to be shifted from mere passive
engagement (based on the said criteria) to actual enforcement. Such an
approach would ultimately suggest greater emphasis on the use of force to
restore or maintain order and limited or partial regard for consent. In Chapter
5, a model is proposed that is intended to serve as a framework, should such
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a shift take place. Whether this is indeed the way forward, seems to be a
source of fierce debate in both the region and the UN.
This chapter aim is to argue whether such a shift is a viable option by
reviewing:
• the origin of peacekeeping and the UN organs responsible for
peacekeeping by way of a historical overview;
• the UN Charter mandating the maintenanceof peace and security;
• the characteristics of 'classical' peacekeepingand its principles;
• how peacekeeping operations are financed;
• the nature of African conflict;
• the United Nations' disengagement as a consequence of the nature of
African conflict;
• the emergence of a 'modern' peacekeeping approach;
• the impact of 'modern' peacekeeping approaches on 'classical' principles
• regional responses to inter-state conflict; and by reviewing
• the future challenges of peacekeeping.
3.2 HistoricalOverview
In 1941, during the Second World War (1939 - 1945), Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, met aboard a battleship in the Atlantic Ocean to plan for the
establishment of an international organisation (United Nations, 1998a:4). The
aim of that historic meeting was to ensure that global peace and security
would prevail and that an occurrence like World War II would not be repeated.
The initial meeting was followed by a meeting with the then leader of the
Soviet Union (USSR), Joseph Stalin, in 1945 in Yalta and by a subsequent
conference in San Francisco in June 1945 during which the UN Charter was
adopted. All of these events initiated the birth of what was to become the
largest international body for the maintenance of peace and security. The UN
was officially constituted on 24 October 1945, during which the majority of the
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founding members of the organisation adopted the UN Charter (United
Nations, 1998a:5).
Within the global context of a world population still stunned by the devastating
effects of World War II, a genuine need for peace and security prevailed. One
primary purpose for the establishment of the UN and a central part of its
mandate was, and still is, the maintenanceof international peace and security.
There is no doubt that over many decades the UN has fulfilled its mandate by
preventing conflict from escalating into war; by persuading opposing parties to
use the conference table rather than force and by assisting in restoring peace
where conflict has erupted. Even though this has been the case, the recurrent
eruption of global intra-state conflict, hostilities between ethnic groups and
recent genocidal practices have left deep scars on the image of the UN as a
messiah duty-bound to save humanity. On the African continent the vivid
images of Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and Angola come to mind as examples of
UN 'failures'. In the final analysis, the UN 'scorecard' in the last decade of this
century, in terms of Africa and even Europe, does not look impressive at all.
During this period it became increasingly evident that the UN is reluctant to
become involved in African peacekeeping, while yet maintaining that the
Security Council must sanction any operation aimed at establishing peace.
This situation creates somewhat of a controversy as it implies that the UN
wishes to be both conductor and musician at the same time.
The Secretary-General, together with two principal organs, namely the
Security Council and the General Assembly, constitute the main role-players
concerned with peace and security. In terms of the UN Charter, which can be
considered an international treaty, member states are obliged, "... to settle
their disputes by peaceful means, and in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" (United Nations,
1998c:68). It goes further by stating that member states are to refrain from
the actual use of or threatening to use force against any state. Any dispute
may be brought before the Security Council who will determine the
appropriate action to be taken.
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Since its inception in 1945, the UN has grown from 51 to 185 members. This
growth can be attributed to the global realisation that peace and stability can
only be achieved through a collective effort. The table below (Figure 3)
depicts the growth of the UN since its inception in 1945 to 1998. Most evident
are two significant growth spurts in UN membership. The first one (1955 to
1960) may be attributed to the advent of the Cold War between the East and
the West and the realisation by small-powered to medium-powered states that
the superpowers will no longer be able to provide security guarantees. In this
temporary void, the UN was viewed as a viable alternative and a symbol of
multilateralism for providing a form of security (Noffke, 1995:17). The second
spurt, which started shortly after 1990, is possibly attributable to the global
response to intra-state conflict and the subsequent search for a collective
approach to peace and security.
FIGURE 3: GROWTH OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP (1945-1998)
Total 60
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985Period 1945 1950
51 118 127 143 153 158
Growth 9 18 9 16 10 5
Source: Adapted from United Nations Department of Public Information (1998c:6)
3.2.1 The Security Council
Under the UN Charter, the Security Council is primarily responsible for the
maintenance of international peace and security. It has fifteen members, of
which five are permanent (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America) and ten members elected by the
General Assembly for a two-year term. The powers and functions of the
Security Council are:
• to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the UN;
• to investigate any dispute or situation that may result in international
friction;
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• to recommend methods of settling such disputes or to recommend the
terms of settlement;
• to formulate plans for establishing a system to regulate armaments;
• to determine the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression and
to recommend what action should be taken;
• to call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures that
do not involve the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
• to take military action against aggressors;
• to perform the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in 'strategic'
areas; and to
• recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-
General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the judges of the
International Court of Justice (United Nations, 1998c:9-10).
In terms of the Security Council's mandate to maintain international peace and
security, members are obliged to accept and carry out the Council's decisions.
Should a dispute be brought to the attention of the Security Council, .the
Council's first reaction is usually to recommend to the parties to reach
agreement by peaceful means. In some cases the Council may undertake to
investigate and mediate a dispute and propose guidelines for a peaceful
settlement. Should a dispute result in fighting, the Council's first concern is to
terminate such hostilities as soon as possible. In order to effect this, the
Council may issue cease-fire directives to prevent further acts of hostility and
protect the lives of innocent civilians often caught in the crossfire. The
Council may, in support of the peace process, deploy military observers or a
peacekeeping force to an area of conflict.
3.2.2 The General Assembly
The General Assembly consists of all the members of the United Nations, and
each member is limited to five representatives. The UN Charter (Article 11)
empowers the General Assembly to, "consider the general principles of co-
operation in the maintenance of international peace and security" and "make
recommendations ... to the Members or to the Security Councilor both". In
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
25
terms of its functional powers, the General Assembly "may discuss any
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security
Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations". It may
furthermore "make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the
states concerned or to the Security Councilor both" (United Nations,
1997:12).
The General Assembly may, under the 'uniting for peace' resolution adopted
in November 1950, take action if the Security Council fails to act as a result of
a lack of unanimity among its five permanent members. "The Assembly is
empowered to consider the matter immediately with a view to making
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including, in the case
of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force" (United
Nations, 1998c:7).
Other functions of the General Assembly include the:
• consideration and recommendation of the principles of co-operation for
maintaining international peace and security, including the principles
governing disarmament and arms regulations;
• initiation of studies and making recommendations to promote international
political co-operation;
• acceptance and consideration of reports from the Security Council and
other UN organs;
• consideration and approval of the UN budget and apportioning
contributions to member states; and
• the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council and other
organs.
Various committees of the General Assembly deal with a variety of issues.
However, issues pertaining to peace and security are dealt with in its First
(Disarmament and International Security) and Fourth (Special Political and
Decolonisation) Committees.
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3.3 'Classical' UN Peacekeeping and its Principles
Peacekeeping is a technique, pioneered and developed by the UN, which
defies simple definition (United Nations, 1998b:2). Peacekeeping is by its
very nature interventionist, and the interpretation and application thereof
differs from operation to operation. The term 'peacekeeping' is, however,
absent from the UN Charter and nowhere is 'peacekeeping' explicitly stated.
In this regard, Dag Hammerskjold (a former Secretary-General of the UN)
referred to it as belonging to 'chapter six and a half. 'Classical' peacekeeping
is also referred to as 'blue helmet' peacekeeping (in reference to the blue
headgear worn by UN peacekeeping forces). At most, peacekeeping is a
complementary measure to resolve tension existing between states. (Also see
Gumbi, 1995:45; Urquhart, 1983:163;Wiseman, 1983:343). This implies that
peacekeeping can neither be regarded as a pacific method of conflict
resolution nor can it be the ultimate solution for the restoration of peace and
security. The term "peacekeeping" was formalised in 1965 with the
establishment of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
(Monnakgotla, 1996:54).
In terms of conflict resolution, the UN Charter classifies the pacific settlement
of disputes as Chapter VI operations, whilst more forceful action is classified
as Chapter VII operations. The advent of peacekeeping as a pacific means
of conflict resolution must be regarded as a technique and concept developed
by the UN in response to a global need for peace and security. It is evident
that the absence of the term 'peacekeeping' in the UN Charter is not owing to
an omission, but is, in fact, a product of the political milieu, which influenced
and guided the thought processes of those who drafted the Charter. The logic
and principles of peacekeeping, although not specifically mentioned in the UN
Charter, thus developed and matured over fifty-years to its current posture in
response to a need for a pacific and lately, active settlement of disputes.
The UN distinguishes two broad categories of peacekeeping operations
(United Nations: 1998b:2). These are
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• military observer missions with small numbers of unarmed officers charged
with such tasks as monitoring cease-fires, verifying troop withdrawals or
patrolling borders or demilitarised zones; and
• peacekeeping forces composed of national contingents of troops deployed
to perform tasks similar to those of military observers, who often act as a
buffer between hostile parties.
A number of UN peacekeeping operations have been conducted since the
UN's inception. In its first five years, only two peacekeeping operations were
undertaken in comparison with the seventeen in the past five years. The first
UN peacekeeping operation in Africa was deployed in the Congo (UNOC2) in
1960. In the fifty years of its existence (from 1948 - 1998) the UN has
committed 750 000 individuals in 49 UN peacekeeping operations worldwide.
Since its inception the UN has lost more than 1 580 military and civilian
peacekeepers deployed in operations (United Nations, 1998b:1). Figure 4
provides a global breakdown of the 49 peacekeeping missions undertaken by
the UN between 1948 and 1998. It is not surprising that over this period, a
total of 16 peacekeeping missions was established on the African continent,
which represents one third of all missions conducted to date.
Europe
1
7
Americas 7 8
4 6 10
Asia 5 2
Middle East 4 4 8
Source: Adapted from the UN Department of Public Information (UN, 1998b:16-17)
According to Steyn (1998:30) sub-Saharan Africa had It ••• [T]wo interstate wars
and fourteen serious intrastate conflicts ... between 1946 and 1988 ... "
2 United Nations Operation in the Congo.
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During this period, only one UN peacekeeping intervention (in the Congo in
1960-62) took place. This number is a matter of concern for two reasons.
Firstly, one could argue that this inaction by the UN suggests a reluctance to
become involved. It may also serve as a possible deliberate signal to African
security organs, such as the OAU and SADC, to resolve their own internal
problems. Secondly, the UN's inaction could be interpreted as an admission
that it lacks the capacity and political will to solve intra-state conflicts. This
view is supported by Malan (1998b:11) when he remarks that, "...[T]he UN
has not been able to react effectively to the imperative to intervene in failed
states in the throes of civil war".
According to Berman and Sams (1998:4) the UN Security Council has
become reluctant, "... to commit UN Blue Helmets in sizable numbers - if at
ell-". In this regard, the lack of commitment displayed by the UN Security
Council can be attributed to the absence of a clear mandate when it comes to
interference in intra-state affairs. The main driving force for committing a
peacekeeping force has, in most cases, been the moral obligation to intervene
when humanitarian considerations prompt action by an outside force. Malan
(1998a: 1) maintains that peacekeeping has remained the preferred term to
describe a diverse range of latter-day multinational interventions, many of
which have borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet
operations, "conducted with consent, impartiality and without resort to force".
'Classical' UN peacekeeping should thus be regarded as being founded on
three universal principles, namely:
• the consent of the parties;
• the impartiality of the peacekeepers; and
• a prohibition on the use of force.
The aforementioned principles will now be discussed in detail in order to
validate the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 1 of this study.
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3.3.1 The Principle of Consent
The consent of the parties involved in a conflict or dispute is one of three
principal requirements for planning, establishing and conducting a
peacekeeping operation. A distinction must be made between consent for an
operation (consent acquired prior to an operation) and consent within an
operation (during the conducting of an operation). Consent for an operation
refers to the consent that a peacekeeper may expect to have obtained
proportionately, from certain people, for certain activities, for certain periods of
time (Dobbie, 1994:122-123). Consent should not be regarded as political
permission for an operation, since it incorporates a wide range of techniques,
which may include negotiation, mediation, community liaison, public
information and civil affairs.
For peacekeepers deployed in a conflict area, a requirement is the consent of
the parties to the conflict. The consent acquired through the various
techniques may be partial or comprehensive. If consent is absent, the
operation becomes peace-enforcement. The SADC intervention in Lesotho
(discussed in detail in Chapter 4) is an example of a peacekeeping operation
that may be coined 'a peace-enforcement operation' due to the absence of
consent from all parties to the conflict.
Consent within an operation pertains to the permission given by conflicting
parties during the execution phase ofa peacekeeping operation. Consent
obtained in this manner is the product of ongoing negotiations, mediation,
bargaining and lobbying between a party of negotiators or a peacekeeping
force and conflicting parties. The consent mustered within an operation is
necessary if the initial terms of engagement are later redefined as a result of
changing circumstances.
The scenario explained here works perfectly in theory, but seldom in practice.
The nature of African conflict holds serious consequences for consent as a
principle of classical peacekeeping. According to Malan (1997c:2) it has
become increasingly difficult to depend on consent as a prerequisite for
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intervention in contemporary humanitarian crises. In many cases, it is
impossible to obtain consent because of the collapse of authority or the
proliferation of groups claiming authority. Under such circumstances,
agreements are worthless and non-existent, because international law and
conventions are openly disregarded. Consent is, however, still considered by
the UN as a prerequisite for intervention and is viewed as a positive
contributor to the success of a planned operation. In this regard, Nhlapo
(1999:3) remarks that, "... peacekeeping operations without consent by the
belligerent parties hold little prospect for success in the long term... ". In a
peacekeeping operation, consent for and within an operation is closely linked
to impartiality since, without consent, breaches of trust and potential conflict of
interest is possible and likely to occur.
3.3.2 The Principle of Impartiality
As a principle of UN peacekeeping, impartiality needs to be adhered by
interventionist forces in order to ensure the absence of bias. According to
Dobbie (1994:133) it requires the widest and most significant application as a
fundamental determinant of a peacekeeper's role. In the first decades of UN
peacekeeping the need for impartiality and disinterestedness partially
contributed to the general practice of not using troops from certain countries
(Adams, 1994:94). In order to effect this, peacekeeping forces from the five
permanent members of the Security Council and neighboring states were not
employed. According to Clapham (1995:145) all peacekeeping forces claim to
act neutrally between the contending parties in the conflict in which they have
intervened. However, in the process "they favour some parties more than
others". The impartiality imperative can only be adhered to if a multinational
force is deployed under the banner of 'classical' peacekeeping, while having a
clear and unambiguous mandate and broad representation (see also Cilliers,
1995:59).
In recent UN operations it became clear that the principle of impartiality was
sorely neglected in the wake of violent inter-state conflict intervention.
Examples thereof can be cited from operations conducted in Africa. In this
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regard, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) operation in Liberia (West Africa) and the intervention in the ORC
and Lesotho (sub-Saharan Africa) can be cited as more recent examples.
The difficulty of remaining impartial is demonstrated when operations are
mounted under the banner of peacekeeping and turn out to be nothing other
than interventions to serve the national interests of a state or states. In this
regard, Adams (1994:139) is of the opinion that peacekeeperswho value their
impartiality are not at liberty to take sides. In terms of peacekeeping versus
peace enforcement, an analogy may be drawn between a peacekeeping
operation and a football game. In such a scenario, the referee (peacekeeper)
is supposed to remain impartial in order to ensure fair play. The players force
their will to win over the referee on the one hand by transgressing the rules of
the game, and on the other hand they attempt to win the game by forcing their
opponent to succumb to their might. If the referee is not impartial, one side
will be favoured over the other.
Given this illustration and the arguments postulated elsewhere in this
document, it would be fair to assume that the 'modern' approaches to conflict
situations have neglected this very important cornerstone of 'classical'
peacekeeping. In addition, it should thus be regarded as one of the main
reasons for the failure of peacekeeping attempts to resolve conflict effectively.
3.3.3 The Principle of Absence of Force
Peacekeeping forces are not supposed to use force. In instances where force
needs to be applied, it should be in self-defence and as a last resort.
Urquhart (1983:165-166) is of the opinion that the absence of force is indeed
one of the main strengths of peacekeeping and that a peacekeeping force
should never be expected to rely only on force to achieve its ends. Should
such a situation arise, it would loose its status of peacekeeper and it would
cease to be above the conflict. According to Cilliers (1995:59), peace support
operations are based on the premise that peaceful methods will generally be
used to achieve a mission's goal. Another premise he adds is that, (raIny use
of force must be justified and carefully controlled". It is evident that, as in the
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case of impartiality, peacekeepers should uphold the principle of the absence
of force as a critical mission success factor. The issue of force will henceforth
be discussed in terms of the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
3.4 The UN Charter
The UN Charter provides the foundation for any action or inaction on the part
of its principal organs, as well as its regional organs. According to Chapter
VI, Article 33 of the UN Charter, '1t]heparties to any dispute,...shall, first of all
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful
means of their own choice". The UN Charter goes further by stating in Article
34 that, '1t]he Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" (United
Nations, 1997:24). These two articles emphasise the importance of a pacific
(peaceful) settlement of disputes as a priority.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter relates to, '1a]ction with respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression" (United Nations,
1997:24). The mandate to enforce decisions taken by the Security Council is
derived from Article 39 which stipulates that the "Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken... " (United Nations, 1997:27). To put this mandate into effect,
the Security Council may take a 'soft' or 'mild' approach, which may constitute
actions, such as embargoes and economic sanctions. It may also, in
accordance with Article 42, authorise a 'hard' or 'harsh' approach, which
would ultimately include the use of force to ensure that mandates are fulfilled.
When a decision to act is made, the UN may request member states to
contribute by way of armed forces assistance, equipment and facilities,
including rights of passage necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security. The authorisation of force is a measure that
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is taken as a last resort when all peaceful means of settling a dispute have
proved to be fruitless, a breach of the peace has occurred or when acts of
aggression have been committed.
In any conflict situation, even when a 'peace mission' has been deployed,
fatalities cannot be excluded. Article 51 of the UN Charter grants members
the right to defend themselves against any armed attack. This right could be
interpreted as a mandate (for a peacekeeping force in an operational
situation) to act in response to an armed attack on one or more of its
members or facilities. The operational history of UN peacekeeping contains
ample examples of incidents where UN peacekeepers have had to resort to
force as a measure of defending themselves against armed attackers. In the
process, a number of fatalities among UN peacekeeping forces has been
recorded. The table below (Figure 5) provides a summary of UN fatalities
over a fifty-year period since its inception.
FIGURE 5: UN FATALITIES -1948 to 1998
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Source: Adapted from statistics of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Situation Centre (1998)
From the statistics contained in Figure 5, it is evident that more than three-
quarters of UN fatalities resulted from accidents (42%) and hostile acts (36%).
These figures clearly indicate that peacekeeping forces are either not properly
trained in preparation for their tasks or they are not readily welcomed by
disputants. According to the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, an essential element of successful peacekeeping
operations is, "the relationship with the local population and the parties to the
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conflict" (United Nations, http://www.un.org). If it is considered that these
fatalities occurred over a fifty-year period, it amounts to less than 3 fatalities
per month, which is a relatively small price to pay for global peace and
security.
3.5 How PeacekeepingOperations are Financed
Peacekeeping, as Javier Pérez de Cuéllar remarked is, "an expensive activity"
(United Nations, 1990:xvi). According to him, the UN peacekeeping budget
for 1989 was almost as great as the UN's regular budget, but by comparison,
it is still relatively small. 'The [cost of the] observer group [UNI/MOG!
monitoring the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq is less than the value of the
crude oil carried in only two supertankers" (United Nations, 1990:xvii). Durch
(1993:6) states in this regard that the hotter the conflict and the sooner the UN
intervenes, the higher those costs are likely to be. A steady increase in the
peacekeeping budget can be observed in the past decade in comparison with
the previous 40 years of UN peacekeeping. The notion that peacekeeping is
an extremely expensive exercise is demonstrated by the 1990 (US $379
million), 1994 (US $3,5 billion) and 1996 (US $3,2 billion) amounts expended
by peacekeeping forces. The United Nations' estimated peacekeeping budget
for July 1997 - June 1998 was approximately US $1 billion. This budget has
been reduced from the US $2.8 billion (which contains an enormous amount
expended in the former Yugoslavia) in 1995 (United Nations, 1998c:20).
According to Mills (1999:1) this reduction in the peacekeeping budget is not
due to a diminution of worldwide or African conflict or the successes of earlier
peace missions. The main reason for this reduction is the reluctance of the
UN to commit peacekeeping forces and resources as it did prior to 1995.
It terms of the financing of peacekeeping operations, the usual practice is for
member states to share the cost proportionately. The General Assembly
apportions expenses according to a special scale of assessment (payment)
applicable to peacekeeping. The assessment scale takes into account the
relative economic strength of member states. The permanent members of the
Security Council are required to pay a greater share because of their special
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responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.
Countries may also volunteer to provide personnel, supplies or other support
for a peace mission for which they are reimbursed in accordance with agreed
upon rates (United Nations, 1998b:6). A participating country's own
government pays peacekeeping soldiers according to their own national rank
and salary scale. Countries volunteering personnel to participate in
peacekeeping operations are reimbursed by the UN at a flat rate of about US
$1,000 per soldier per month. This situation may lead to corruption on a
massive scale, as some countries, which experience huge value differences in
their exchange rates to the US dollar, pay their soldiers far below the
proposed flat rate. It could therefore be argued that even though countries
participating in peacekeeping cannot afford to send a peacekeeping
contingent (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), they do so in the hope of
making a lucrative profit from the reimbursements by the UN. In this regard,
Corum (1995:122) states that "...many developing nations have turned to
peacekeeping as a source of revenue".
Since the 1960's the UN has been plagued by financial difficulties mainly
because member states pay their assessments late or only partially. This
situation worsened during the 1990's, even as the UN was launching the
largest and most complex UN operations to date in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992
to 1995). The estimated cost for this operation amounted to almost US $4.8
billion, with more than 80 000 military and civilian peacekeepers being
deployed. (United Nations, 1998b:63).
According to statistics provided by the UN, its member states owe more than
US $1.5 billion, of which the arrears of the United States of America account
for approximately half this amount (United Nations, 1998b:7). The non-
payment of assessments by member states impacts negatively on the UN's
ability to fund peacekeeping operations. One ever-present consideration is:
Who is footing the bill? In conflict areas where negotiated settlements are not
evident, peacekeeping operations may take far longer than initially
3 UNIIMOG- Acronym for United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.
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anticipated. This delay inevitably causes the peacekeeping budget to
increase. In terms of financing an operation, Berman and Sams (1998:12)
draw a significant distinction between multinational forces and peacekeeping
forces. According to them, UN peacekeeping operations are financed from
the assessment budget whilst UN multinational forces are financed through
voluntary contributions, "...with participants expected to cover their own
costs". Consequently the UN favours the deployment of multinational forces
owing to the actual and potential financial relief it brings to the peacekeeping
budget.
Apart from financing an operation, the UN also reimburses countries for
equipment and personnel contributions. Reimbursements to these countries
are often deferred owing to cash shortages caused by member states' failure
to pay their dues. From a financial point of view, this could be a contributing
factor to the UN's evident reluctance to become involved in peacekeeping on
especially the African continent, where the prolonged nature of conflict tends
to increase peacekeeping operational costs. It can therefore be concluded
that even though the UN may wish to become involved, the extent of its
involvement is often determined by financial constraints beyond its control -
adding another 'justification' to their growing inventory of 'justifications'.
3.6 The Changing Nature of African Conflict
Civil wars or regional conflicts have, since the end of World War II, plagued all
the major regions of the developing world. According to Ayoob (1995:47) two
major sources of inter-state conflict can be observed. One source is the
intermeshing of domestic insecurities with inter-state antagonisms and the
second source relates to the autonomous dynamics of regional conflict, which
is often centered on the aspirations of preeminent regional powers. In many
instances the latter is a legacy of the colonial era. In this regard, Hough holds
the view that contemporary African conflicts have a unique character and do
not fit into the former conceptual framework of bipolar confrontation between
East and West (1998:47). In most cases 'poor' countries (of which numerous
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constitute the African continent) have been particularly affected by protracted
internal struggles that sporadically erupt into violence.
According to Steyn (1998:26) African states are caught up in both domestic
and cross-border conflict. Such conflicts originate from age-old feuds, foreign
interest, arms smuggling and mercenary soldiering. In addition to these,
Annan (1998:21) cites political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian,
human rights, environmental, economic, social, cultural and demographic
reasons as the root causes of violence. Malan (1998a:4) is of the opinion that
African conflict is caused by a combination of internal and international conflict
with the local civilian populations suffering serious human rights violations on
a large scale. These conflict situations result in a large number of refugees
and displaced persons, which can be attributed to the following factors:
• a lack of coincidence between nations and states, ethnic tension and the
suppression of minorities;
• corrupt and dictatorial regimes;
• support for such regimes by international arms traders;
• chronic poverty and underdevelopment; and
• a grinding debt burden. (Republic of South Africa, 1998:19.)
In addition to these causes, one could also add the involvement of
neighbouring states that form alliances with conflicting parties. An example of
such an alliance is found in the conflict-ridden Democratic Republic of the
Congo, where Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad support the 'legitimate'
government of President Laurent Kabila and Zambia, Uganda and Rwanda
support the opposition (UN Secretary General, 1999:SC/6654).
What is increasingly being observed on the African continent, is the
intractability of conflict. Friedman (1999:13) attributes African conflict to
political patterns that have developed and have become reinforced over years
and to failed states with leaders that have shallow roots and a low capacity to
settle conflicts politically. No foolproof blueprint exists to deal with African
conflict situations since each one is different from the other (Urquhart,
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1983:167). The UN's peacekeeping capabilities were devised to deal with
inter-state violence (hostile acts between states) and not intra-state (within
states) violence and conflicts. Annan, in his report to the UN Security Council
notes that, "... 14 of the 33 wars on the African continent were afflicted by
armed conflict in 1996 alone and over 30 have occurred in Africa since 1970,
mostly within states". These wars, "...accounted for more than half of all war-
related deaths worldwide and caused more than 8 million people to become
refugees, returnees and displaced persons" (United Nations, 1998, SG/2045).
In this regard, the reluctance of the UN to become involved can be interpreted
,
as indicative of either a lack of ability or a lack of political will or both. By own
admission, the UN's Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, echoes this sentiment,
when he states that, "African leaders have failed the people of Africa; the
international community has failed them; the United Nations has failed them"
(United Nations, 1998: SG/2045).
3.7 The United Nations' Response to African Conflict
The UN's peacekeeping performance on the African continent over the past
decade has raised serious doubts as to whether the UN has the capacity or
will to deal effectively with intra-state and inter-state conflict. The UN regards
mediation, conciliation and arbitration as primary instruments of conflict
management (Steyn, 1998:29). The UN's will to intervene in African conflicts
is determined by a number of factors, and constructive UN involvement is
hampered by, among others, the
• view that intra-state conflict (as opposed to inter-state conflict) requires a
domestic solution with minimum outside interference;
• belief that little can be done about violence of an ethnic origin;
• assumption that the UN's primary instruments must be used to solve
conflict;
• fear that peacekeepers may become targets of belligerent parties;
• notion that a cease-fire agreement needs to have been concluded before
the UN will consider deploying a peacekeeping force; and the
• view that regional-organ involvement should precede UN action.
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What is evident, though, is that the UN is actively seeking co-operation with
regional organisations. In this regard, the co-operation with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and the OAU in
Somalia and Western Sahara can be cited as examples. The UN is
constantly monitoring African conflict and support efforts by parties to find a
negotiated solution.
The evident increase in global crises requires a comprehensive response
aimed at resolving conflict, assisting in humanitarian crises and establishing a
lasting peace agreement between warring factions. In this regard, Malan
(1997b:1) argues that, "the traditional concept of peacekeeping has become
an irrelevant means of addressing African conflict in the crisis stage" and
consequently the "present conceptions of peace-enforcement are doomed to
failure". Adams, who contends that, "UN peacekeeping in recent years have
proved unpromising and onerous", supports this view (1994:107).
3.8 The Emergenceof the 'Modern' PeacekeepingApproach
From the provisions of the Arlicles of the UN Charter, it is apparent that the
Security Council's main concern is to maintain international peace and
security. When international peace is threatened, the UN has a moral
obligation to act in accordance with the provisions and stipulations of the
Arlicles contained in the UN Charter. Since the establishment of the UN fifty
years ago, significant changes in the peacekeeping environment have taken
place. However, no such changes are reflected in the UN Charter. What we
do see is an 'outdated' document that does not reflect current realities.
Traditional tasks of UN peacekeeping operations from 1950 to 1970 included
monitoring and enforcing cease-fires, observing frontier lines and positioning
forces between belligerents (Adams, 1994:94).
In stark contrast to these tasks, peacekeeping forces consisting of military and
civilian contingents have had to face 'modern' challenges not previously
encountered during deployment. Adams (1994:95) refers to these as the
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'new'tasks of UN peacekeeping forces. These tasks include activities, such
as:
• monitoring (and even running) elections, such as those in Namibia, EI
Salvador, Angola and Mozambique;
• protecting the inhabitants of a region such as the United Nations
Protection Area in Croatia;
• ensuring the partial demilitarisation of particular areas, such as around
Sarajevo and Gorazde in Bosnia;
• guarding the weapons surrendered by or taken from parties to a conflict;
• assuring the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and performing a wide
range of other humanitarian tasks during conflicts;
• assisting in the reconstruction of governmental or policing functions after a
civil war; and
• reporting on violations of the laws of armed conflict by belligerents.
These additional or 'new' tasks fulfilled by peacekeeping forces prove that UN
peacekeeping, as it was envisaged, is vastly different from the realities of
'modern' peacekeeping, and that the 'classical' concept of peacekeeping
needs to be revisited and reviewed. These adaptations made by the UN in
response to peacekeeping realities illustrate that the UN is committed to
change. If one, however, considers the challenges to peacekeeping as they
have manifested themselves globally over the last decade of this century
(compared to the tepid response by the UN) serious doubts are raised
regarding this 'commitment'.
3.9 The Impact of 'Modern' PeacekeepingApproaches on 'Classical'
Principles
The challenge to Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping has created a dilemma
for both the UN and for regional organs. Peacekeeping as it was conceived
and practised prior to the last decade of this century, has undergone major
changes in its methods, composition and mandate. These changes can be
attributed mainly to the nature of current Sub-Saharan African inter-state
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conflict and the inability and apparent unwillingness of the UN to deal with it
effectively. The UN's 'classical' peacekeeping dispensary has, to a large
extent, run out of remedies and cures as regards 'modern' threats to security
and peace. What is evidently required, is a comprehensive approach to
resolve yet another dimension of instability and threats to regional peace and
security. Such an approach would include:
• a proper appreciation of the causal factors contributing to conflict;
• an evaluation of the intentions and objectives of the parties to conflict;
• taking cognisance of the lessons learnt from completed missions; and
• a plan of action to address conflict situations, thereby ensuring that
mission objectives are satisfied.
In view of the reluctance of member states to provide forces and support for
peacekeeping initiatives, the onus is placed firmly on the regional organs to
serve this need. Upon examining the abundant literature on conflict and
peacekeeping in Africa, it becomes evident that 'peacekeeping' has been
highjacked to describe and justify new approaches, such as peace
enforcement, peace-making, peace restoration, peace-building, preventative
diplomacy and a host of other 'modern' approaches not envisaged in the UN
Charter. According to Malan (1998a:2) these multinational approaches have
borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet operations. Also
evident is that these approaches have been inadequate in terms of the
'classical' principles of consent, impartiality and absence of force. The
inconsistencies arising from these mutations of peacekeeping have a negative
impact on the 'classical' principles of peacekeeping as a means of resolving
conflict mainly because a comprehensive framework is lacking within which
each approach can be clearly defined.
Africa and the Balkans have emerged as the most dangerous and challenging
environments for conducting peacekeeping operations (Malan, 1999b:4). In
an African context, the emergence of peace enforcement as an alternative to
peacekeeping warrants a deeper investigation than mere mention. The
reason for this assertion is twofold. Firstly, peace enforcement is increasingly
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used as an alternative and even substitute for peacekeeping. Secondly, the
nature of this concept has resulted in what Williams (1996:28) refers to as, "a
grey area ... between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations"
which still is a cause of controversy among analysts today.
In addressing the latter controversy, Malan (1998b:11) refers to 'peace
enforcement' as an "oxymoron" because of the absence of peace during such
operations. The term 'peace enforcement' has existed in the realm of theory
since 1992, when it was viewed as consisting of units intervening impartially in
a civil war in order to compel the warring parties to conduct peace talks as a
prelude to the establishment of a cease-fire and the eventual deployment of a
peace force. In 1993, Boutros-Ghali (a former UN Secretary-General) in 'An
Agenda for Peace', proposed that, "...the [UN] Council consider the utilisation
of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their
terms of reference specified in advance" (cited in Malan, 1997b:2). Time and
again, one or even all three 'classical' principles are not upheld and peace
operations cross the magical 'classical' peacekeeping divide in a quest to
address conflict situations.
It is also evident that 'classical' peacekeeping cannot be done 'by the book' in
an African conflict situation. A 'classical' approach is also not the solution,
and a balance will therefore have to be struck between an increased need for
a 'modern' approach and the moral and humanitarian imperatives of traditional
peacekeeping practices. What is evident though, is that the term
'peacekeeping' is a misnomer on the African continent, because interventions
are still largely based on traditional peacekeeping practices even though they
fail to adhere to traditional principles. In the final analysis, the time has come
for Africa and the UN to face reality.
3.10 Regional Responses to Intra-State and Inter-State Conflict
In this section, a distinction will be drawn between institutional and societal
responses to intra-state and inter-state conflict. The aim of this discussion is
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to provide a framework and point of departure for the cases discussed in
Chapter4.
3.10.1 Institutional Responses
'Institutional responses' refers to the abundance of regional institutions,
agencies and organs responsible for the maintenance of peace and security.
These institutions consist mainly of military, inter-governmental and non-
governmental institutions that are involved in some way or another with the
issues of peace and security.
Article 52 of the UN Charter makes provision for the establishment of,
"regional arrangements or agencies" under the authority of the Security
Council (UN, 1997:34). In terms of Article 53, the UN may utilise these
regional organs for enforcement action, with the proviso that no such action
shall take place without the authorisation of the Security Council. The UN
Charter also explicitly states in Article 33 that disputants should exhaust
regional possibilities before invoking UN measures (Pelcovits, 1983:258). The
establishment of treaties between states has been and still is a practice that
ensures co-operation and collective action. Numerous examples of such
organs are found world-wide. The most commonly known ones include the
United Nations (UN) established in 1945, and The North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) established in 1949.
The principal regional bodies responsible for peace and security in Africa are
the Organisation for African Unity (OAU); the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). The importance of these organisations as regional security
organs, as well as their current and future involvement in conflict resolution,
cannot be underestimated. This is a view supported by Malan when he
remarks that, 'Tt]he nature and scope of contemporary humanitarian
emergencies generated by conflict in Africa continue to exceed the
international community's will and capacity to respond" (1997a:1). This
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statement by Malan, effectively signifies that the capacity of regional organs
for dealing with African conflict will have to be enhanced and expanded.
In order to contextualise the importance of regional organisations in Africa, the
origin, mandate and functional roles of three such organisations will briefly be
discussed and comparedwith the UN.
3.10.1.1 The OAU
The OAU was founded in 1963 on the vision of pan-Africanism to foster
political and economic co-operation. Its operational philosophy is based on
the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states
(W'iseman, 1983:359). In a regional capacity, the OAU depends largely on the
techniques of negotiation, mediation and arbitration as conflict-resolution
measures. This is also explicitly confirmed in Article 3 of the OAU Charter,
where it is stated that the OAU will not interfere in the internal affairs of states.
This clause may prove to be a serious drawback, should the OAU be forced to
intervene in humanitarian crises, because it will not have the mandate in
terms of its own charter.
In order to strengthen its capacity to deal with intra-state conflict and to
manage conflict more effectively, the OAU adopted the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. This OAU
Mechanism provides for:
• a central decision-making body, the Central Organ, consisting of about 16
members states and selected states representing the sub-regions of Africa
which meet at head of state-, ministerial- and ambassadorial level; and
• the establishment of a Conflict Management Division within the OAU
Secretariat (Vogt, 1998:6).
In terms of its mandate this mechanism is to provide the Secretary-General
with the initiative to manage conflict within the region and to mobilise
resources from within and outside the continent. Vogt (1998:4) is of the
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opinion that the establishment of this mechanism has resulted in the
development of the capacity of the OAU to:
• anticipate and prevent conflict through a wide range of early warning
systems;
• deploy special envoys to mediate and shepherd conflict resolution
processes; and to
• deploy peacekeeping forces, civilian police, military observers and political
officers in conflict areas.
It is evident that the Security Council members (United States of America and
Germany in particular) are reluctant to commit their troops to UN interventions
in Africa, especially in light of their experiences and the eventual loss of life in
Rwanda and Somalia. The UN's financial and institutional support for the
OAU should therefore be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to invest in the
development of a regional capability in Africa to deal with African conflict.
However, it is believed that the OAU lacks the institutional capacity to
intervene with a peace force in a conflict situation because, as Malan
(199?b:3) observes, "sub-regional organisations in Africa were established for
co-ordination of economic development, and their political and security
frameworks are very immature". The assumption that the OAU lacks the
institutional capacity is thus justified, since the OAU displayed its inability to
deploy a peace force during the failed Nigerian-led intervention in Chad (Vogt
1998:?). This evidently exposed the organisation's weaknesses in terms of its
ineffective mission policy framework, its technical incapacity and its lack of
financial resources. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the
UN should not abdicate its mandated responsibility to seek global peace and
security by relegating this responsibility to regional organs. The question that
remains unanswered is: How can the UN expect from a regional organisation
like the OAU to set matters right when it (the UN) has been struggling for fifty
years to do so?
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3.10.1.2 The SADe
In 1980 the SADC was established as the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Conference (SADCC). According to the Institute for Security
Studies (ISS, 1998: 1), the SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty
or protocol for the first twelve years of its existence. The SADC was formally
constituted with the signing of 'The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC' in
Windhoek (Namibia) in 1992 (Malan and Cilliers, 1997: 1). Under the auspices
of the SADC, a specific organ deals with matters of peace and security. This
body, which was established in January 1996 at a meeting with SADC
ministers in Gaborone, is known as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security. Its objectives are, among others, to:
• protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict
and external aggression;
• promote political co-operation among member states and to develop a
common political value system and institutions;
• develop a common foreign policy as regards matters of mutual concern
and interest and to lobby, as a region, on issues of common interest at
international forums;
• co-operate fully as regards regional security and defence through conflict-
prevention management and resolution;
• mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
• use preventative diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region - both within
and between states - through an early warning system;
• seek an end to conflict through diplomatic means and, when such means
fail, to take 'punitive' measures;
• promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and
practices within member states by encouraging the observance of
universal human rights;
• promote peace-making and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable
peace and security;
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• develop a collective security capacity and to conclude a mutual defence
pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping
capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region,
or elsewhere on the continent; and to
• deal with extra-regional conflicts that impact on peace and security in
Southern Africa (Hough, 1998:29-30).
At present this organ essentially exists only at head of state and the Inter-
state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) levels (Malan and Cilliers,
1997:2). Compared with the OAU, the SADC still has to go some way to
reach the same functional levels of interaction and interoperability. This could
prove to be a serious hindrance to its effectiveness as a regional organ to act
pro-actively in the spheres of both the peace and security.
It is evident that the mandate of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security provides a framework of good intentions and is described by the ISS
as, "lofty goals with very little ... substantial guidelines" (ISS, 1998:1). This
description emphasises the need for sufficient mechanisms to put its mandate
into effect. Unfortunately, even with the best intentions, policies are doomed
to failure if the pre-implementation and post-implementation infrastructure is
lacking. A review of the SADC track record as a regional organ for peace and
security thusfar, reveals that its performance as a peace enforcer surpasses
that of peacekeeper. The Lesotho invasion under the pretext of
peacekeeping, as well as the intervention in the DRC (both of which will be
discussed in Chapter 4), conjures up vivid images in support of this notion.
3.10.1.3 ECOWAS
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in
May 1975. The treaty establishing ECOWAS included the maintenance of
regional peace, stability and security through promoting and strengthening
good neighbourliness. Provision was also made for the establishment of a
regional peace and security observation system and peacekeeping forces
where appropriate. Two organs are responsible for issues on defence,
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namely the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (Defence
Protocol) and the Protocol on Non-Aggression.
The Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted in 1978with a view to creating,
"an atmosphere, free of any fear of attack or aggression of one state by
another" (Aning, 1999:3). It furthermore makes provision for member states
to:
• refrain from threatening to use or using force or aggression in their
relations with one another;
• refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion,
hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political
independence of other members; and to
• respond to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes that arise
among member states (Hough, 1998:32-33).
The Defence Protocol took effect only in 1986 and, among others, makes
provision for:
• collective regional security, since a threat or act of aggression against any
member is regarded as being directed at the entire community of states;
• mutual aid and assistance in respect of any armed threat or aggression;
• the mediation of conflict between two member states of the Community;
and for,
• if need be, the interposition of the Allied Army Forces of the Community
between the troops engaged in conflict (Hough, 1998:30-32).
As a regional security framework, these two treaties, together with the revised
'Treaty of 1993', provided specific blueprints and limitations for state action, as
well as a collective defence system (Aning, 1999:3).
In terms of peacekeeping, ECOWAS deployed the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in August 1990.
This group initially consisted of 4 000 and eventually of 12 000 troops. The
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ECOMOG operation illustrated the incapacity of regional organs acting as
peacekeepers because, as Malan (1999:49) remarks, "Units initially landed
without intelligence or military maps ... some without personal weapons
... boots and uniforms ... and adequate logistics". The worst aspect of this
operation is that the same problems existed eight years later. Another
problem was the alleged partiality, brutality and corruption of ECOMOG
troops.
ECOMOG was hailed as a regional initiative which saved many lives albeit at
considerable cost to the member states, especially Nigeria who sacrificed 500
lives and footed a bill of more than US $1 billion (Malan, 1999a:50). As a
peacekeeping operation in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG has
been legitimised by means of, "ex post facto Security Council resolutions, the
co-deployment of UN observer missions, and the overt support of major donor
countries" (Malan, 1999a:51). Malan's observation once again supports the
notion that the UN is slowly shifting its mandated responsibility to regional
organisations.
A review of the three regional organisations discussed above reveals that their
success rates are equally low in terms of conflict resolution in a regional
context. Despite ongoing capacity-building initiatives by the UN to strengthen
African peacekeeping capabilities, it is evident that to abdicate its
responsibility towards these organs would be an irresponsible course of
action. Too many restraining forces impact negatively on these organs (at
least in the short-term to medium-term) for such organs to take complete
ownership for African peace and security.
3.10.2 Societal Responses
The societal responses referred to in this document relate to the impact of
internal and external violence, war and conflict on the inhabitants of a conflict-
ridden state or society.
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Conflict within a state arguably has a greater impact on the populace of a
particular region or state than any other natural occurrence. The collapse of
state structures and subsequent take-over by (usually) a military regime
causes a definite shift in the balance of power. History has proved that the
local civilian population suffers most when gross abuses of human rights
occur. In violent conflict situations, millions of people are displaced or killed,
communities disintegrate, corruption is at the order of the day, basic services
deteriorate beyond redemption, aid intended for the needy fall into the hands
of the perpetrators, and warlords run amok in a lawless society. A typology of
African armed conflicts is given by Lodge (1998:1-5), who categorises
regional conflict into seven major categories, namely:
• ethnic competition for control of the state;
• regional or secessionist rebellions;
• continued liberation conflict;
• fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority;
• warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse;
• protracted conflict within politicised militaries; and
• border disputes.
Lodge (1988:1-5) also makes the comment that such conflicts are common in
countries where the state has been weak; that several of these hostilities
occur as a consequence of national rivalries within regions and that they are a
consequence of militarised religious opposition to secular states.
In the wake of all these factors, regional responses have still a long way to go
in their quest for a universal plan of action and a workable solution to a
seemingly insurmountable problem.
3.11 Future Challenges for African Peacekeeping
Much has been said about what the UN needs to do in order to promote
peacekeeping as a means of intervention as opposed to other inappropriate
interventionist measures. African peacekeeping is at a crossroads, and a
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51
transition needs to be made from 'classical' UN peacekeeping principles to a
'modern' approach that satisfies current demands. One school of thought
argues in favour of regional responses to conflict resolution, while another
argues in favour of sustained UN intervention. Both these arguments are
fundamentally flawed: where one is evidently reluctant and lacks the political
will, the other lacks the institutional capacity required to meet the challenge.
This view is supported by Landsberg (1999:47) who writes: "[TJoo often those
states with the resources lack the will and those with the will lack the
resources; the able are unwilling and the willing are unable". Accordingly, this
situation creates a "paralysing paradox".
In short, the following may be regarded as the challenges for African
peacekeeping:
• maintaining the division between peacekeeping and peace enforcement,
with clear mandates for operational deployments;
• enhancing the political, institutional, financial and operational capacity of
regional organs;
• political commitment, unity of purpose and trend establishment by the
willing and able;
• the provision of adequate equipment and matériel by regional and
international organisations;
• networking to revitalise the continental debate on peace and security;
• strengthening the capacity of existing initiatives, Le. The African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI), to deal with conflict in the region; and
• revitalising the early warning system as a method of intervening to avoid
the implementation of comprehensive intervention measures.
3.12 Conclusion
The renewed conflict on the African continent, especially in the Great Lakes
region, has placed the issue of peacekeeping and similar conflict-resolution
mechanisms on the global agenda. The preceding discussion reveals that
peacekeeping as a means of resolving conflict has had it successes and
failures. It also reveals that the time has come to re-evaluate the manner in
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which peacekeeping is being conducted in intra-state conflict situations. The
question may indeed be posed as to whether peacekeeping in its current
'classical' guise still has a place in Sub-SaharanAfrica.
The UN's apparent reluctance to become involved has left Africa to find
solutions to its own problems. One may add that, in many instances, these
solutions have contributed insignificantly to improving the situation. African
organs responsible for peace and security have strongly come to the fore as
an inadequate but willing response to regional peacekeeping needs. In a UN
press release, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, warns that African
efforts to resolve conflict should be complemented and not supplemented by
the UN efforts (UN Secretary General, 1998:SG/2045). An obstacle that
unfortunately detracts from African peace initiatives is that conflict is not
resolved in accordance with 'classical' peacekeeping principles.
Despite the increased intensity and frequency of global conflict and a strong
signal to the UN to strengthen its future peacekeeping capacity in especially
Africa, the UN remains firm in its belief that conditions must be right before
intervention will be considered. An earnest need for intervention has become
evident in the midst of serious reconsideration of Super Power involvement.
On the negative side, this reluctance to act may still prove to be a serious
threat to the future of 'classical' UN peace initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa;
on the positive side it may well serve as a much-needed impetus for
enhancing the capacity of regional organs.
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CHAPTER4
CASE STUDIES
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 it is hypothesised that the current Sub-Saharan African practice
of resolving conflict is inconsistent with the UN peacekeeping principles of
consent, impartiality and the absence of force.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate both the SADC's intervention in the
Republic of Lesotho and the current security situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The evaluation will be done in terms of the
'classical' UN principles of peacekeepingwith the aim of establishing the level
of compliance and also to illustrate the misinterpretation of peacekeeping
principles in a Sub-Saharan African context. Although these interventions can
by no means be classified as 'peacekeeping' operations, they will be
evaluated as such in view of the model proposed in Chapter 5. The
intervention in Lesotho (1998) and the current intervention in the DRC (1999-
2000) will thus be analysed in terms of the principles of consent, impartiality
and the use of force in order to determine whether these interventions
substantiate or refute the hypothesis.
A significant difference that must be pointed out is that the DRC conflict is
current (2000), whilst the Lesotho invasion (1998) by SADC forces has
already taken place. This difference implies that different analytical
approaches are required. In the case of Lesotho, the analysis is based on a
past experience, and in the case of the DRC, the analysis is based partly on
past experience in terms of the events that have already taken place and
partly on forecasting as to what may still happen.
The analysis will be done within the parameters of the following framework:
• an overview of events preceding the operations;
• an overview of the operational mandates and objectives;
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• a comparison of UN principles to the practices of the SADC force(s); and
• a conclusion based on these assessments.
4.2 The SADe Intervention in the Republic of Lesotho (Operation
BOLEAS)
4.2.1 General Overview
The Republic of Lesotho, a mountain Kingdom surrounded by South Africa, is
not new to, "...violent power struggles, politically motivated assassinations
and coups" (Makoa 1996:13). Lesotho is also not new to political instability
because, even as far back as 1965/66, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP)
refused to recognise the Basotho National Party (BNP) and, 'TtJheensuing
political instability claimed scores of lives" (Makoa 1996:16). Numerous
struggles for political power characterise the political history of this nation-
state, and it seems as if these power struggles recurrently erupted into violent
takeovers. Examples of such takeovers are the one in 1970 by Jonathan' s
BNP and military coups in both 1986 and 1991 by Lekhanya and Ramaema
respectively (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:4).
In contrast to a 1994 call for intervention, the South African government this
time heeded a request by the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr. Pakalitha
Masisili, (on behalf of the Lesotho government) to restore law and order by
means of an intervention. During the early hours of 22 September 1998, a
600-strong South African military task force entered Lesotho (Neethling,
1999:1). The request came about as a result of an attempted coup d'état by
rebellious Lesotho soldiers. The intervention was to be conducted under the
SADC banner, with armed forces deployed from the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF) and a 200-strong force from the Botswana Defence
Force (BDF). However, the BDF arrived only at nightfall on 22 September
1998, and the initial intervention was a solo act by a SANDF contingent. In
reference to the BDF's involvement, Tapfumanyei (1999:23) observes that,
"South Africa enlisted Botswana's token support to invade Lesotho, with
hardly any SAOGsanction".
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After the election in Lesotho, large-scale unrest broke out and a state of
lawlessness prevailed. Van Nieuwkerk (1999:1) describes the intervention as,
"an orgy of destruction, looting, and violence which resulted in 39 casualties".
The main reasons for the unrest were the rejection of the election results by
the Lesotho opposition parties and the subsequent rejection of the findings of
the Langa Report (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1). The events following the election
resulted in the Lesotho government summoning the support of its South
African counterpart.
4.2.2 Overview of the Operational Mandate and Objectives
In terms of the hypothesis formulated in this document, the Lesotho invasion
cannot be classified as a 'true' peacekeeping operation, even though it will be
analysed as such. The reason for this course of action is the assumption that
any deployment of troops in a sovereign state must. be conducted in
accordance with a UN Chapter VI or VII mandates. In the case of Lesotho,
Operation BOLEAS would have required a Chapter VII UN mandate. Despite
the absence of a UN mandate, the operation went ahead with a SADC
mandate based on the perceived critical humanitarian need for an
intervention. The reason for the intervention was (according to the SANOF),
"... to intervene militarily ... to prevent any further anarchy and to create a
stable environment for the restoration of law and order" (SANDF,
http://www.mil.za). The SADC mandate, although obtained before the
intervention, was from the onset, clouded in suspicion regarding the manner in
which it was obtained. This situation resulted in strong media reaction which
targeted particularly the South African government's for "poor planning" and
"flawed execution" (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1).
4.2.3 Comparison of the UN Principles with the Practices of the SADC
Forces
The assumption is made that African peace organs lack the coherence, ability
and capacity to perform operations under the banner of peacekeeping. In
view of this assumption, the operation in Lesotho will be analysed from a
policy content perspective in order to establish a framework for comparing the
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operation to both the 'classical' UN principles of peacekeeping (consent,
impartiality and the absence of force) and the practices of the forces involved
in the current events in the DRC.
4.2.3.1 Consent
In view of the abovementioned criterion for intervention, it can be argued that
the SADC force had partial consent. The request by the 'legitimate'
government of Lesotho, which followed elections clouded by allegations of
dishonesty, provided the partial consent required for intervention. However,
no consent was obtained from or granted by the Lesotho opposition or any
other party to the dispute. According to Hansen (1999:3), consent is akin to
legitimacy, in which the latter relates to, "the acceptance of the peace force
[intervention force], as well as its mandate ... by the international community
and by the parties to the conflict". In Lesotho's case this is evidently not true,
because the armed Lesotho opposition countered the SADC intervention.
Another factor to consider regarding the issue of legitimacy is the call for
assistance by what opposition parties perceived to be an 'illegitimate'
government following a disputed election result.
Consent and legitimacy should also be viewed from a SADC perspective. In
this regard, consent was obtained by means of, "... a series of phone calls
between the relevant heads of state" (Neethling, 1999:12). This state of
affairs places a big question mark over the institutional capabilities and
transparency of the SADC as a regional organ entrusted with decisions to
sanction military intervention. The intervention in Lesotho was never
authorised by the UN Security Council (Malan, 1999c:94). Another
consideration, although beyond the scope of this paper, is whether this
intervention operation was legitimate in terms of international law. A proper
analysis of these factors may hold serious implications for future operations of
this nature. It can thus be concluded that the 'classical' principle of consent in
the Lesotho intervention was only partially satisfied.
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4.2.3.2 Impartiality
As has been stated previously, the concept of impartiality is a prerequisite for
successful intervention. The mere fact that South Africa geographically
surrounds Lesotho confirms that the South Africa government cannot be
regarded to be impartial. South Africa's national interests in terms of its
capital investment in Lesotho (specifically the Lesotho Highlands project, its
fuel depots and key buildings), as well as the devastating effect that displaced
citizens may have on the South African economy, support this notion. By own
admission, one of the stated reasons for South Africa's intervention was, ti ••• to
protect South African assets ... " (Neethling, 1999:3). If viewed in terms of the
'classical' UN principles, the SADC intervention in Lesotho did not meet the
requirements of impartiality and, as such, the legitimacy of the intervention is
questionable.
4.2.3.3 TheUseof Force
In an assessment of the use of force in the Lesotho intervention, one
significant feature was the level of force employed by the SADC force. The
authorisation of force in Lesotho came about as a measure to curb the acts of
aggression by the Lesotho opposition. In a SANDF Info Bulletin (No. 57/98)
the force levels used in the intervention operation are described in vivid detail.
A summarised version of the various forces includes:
• the South African Army, which deployed a mechanised battalion (inclusive
of armoured personnel carriers, infantry contingents and military police),
with an airborne company in reserve;
• the South African Air Force, which deployed six Oryx transport helicopters,
two A/ouette 11/ gunships, two A/ouette helicopters and a Cessna Caravan
(aircraft);
• a medical task group; and
• the BOF, which deployed only a mechanised infantry company.
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The entire SADC force constituted a manpower component of 800 soldiers.
From the beginning, the SADC force (in fact it was initially only the SANDF
contingent) met with strong, armed resistance from the Royal Lesotho
Defence Force (RLDF), which resulted in eight casualties and numerous
injuries among SANDF ranks. The total number of casualties was thirty-nine
(Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1). It can therefore be concluded that, in terms of
'classical' UN peacekeeping principles, the SADC intervention in Lesotho
cannot be classified as a peacekeeping operation. The force levels that were
engaged in the operation constitute a force large enough to make war not
peace. The SADC's invasion of Lesotho should much rather be viewed as a
peace enforcement operation, falling within the ambit of a Chapter VII
mandate.
4.2.4 Conclusion
Any justification for military intervention, including the use of force or a threat
to use force (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) on the grounds that it is in the
interest of peace, must proceed from the assumption that such action is an
absolute last resort. If a decision is made to act on humanitarian grounds,
then a peace enforcement or intervention operation should be mounted in
order to have a justified legal mandate that allows for deviation from the
'classical' UN principles of peacekeeping.
The intervention in Lesotho is indicative of the deterioration of regional
initiatives in the absence of a proper operational mandate. What happened in
Lesotho is unjustifiable and falls within the realm of the powerful policing of
South Africa's backyard, although it may be argued that the intentions were
noble and based upon humanitarian considerations. This evident unilateral
action as a means to contain intra-state conflict, should be condemned in the
strongest possible terms and should not be allowed to supersede the political
resolution of conflict and multinational involvement. Moreover, Operation
BOLEAS was in contravention of South Africa's own stance on preventative
diplomacy, as contained in the White Paper on Participation in International
Peace Missions (Republic of South Africa, 1998:12). In this regard, the official
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view is, "persuasion or show of force, rather than ... the use of force". The
intervention was also undertaken without a UN sanctioning resolution or
mandate. One positive outcome of the Lesotho intervention was the
resumption of talks that paved the way for another round of elections.
4.3 The SADC Intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC)
4.3.1 GeneralOverview
Conflict in the DRC can be traced back to the systematic collapse of state
institutions weakened by, "predatory corrupt government and elite
factionalism" (Lodge, 1998:3). According to Breytenbach et al. (1999:33),
present-day problems may be traced back to the history of boundary
demarcation by colonial powers.
A contributing factor to the current state of affairs is what Lodge (1998:3)
refers to as mainly the result of the state being administered by, "...a series of
regional fiefdoms largely built around the control of smuggling routes by
military chiefs". One such historical example is Mobutu Sese Seko, who was
a colonel in the Congolese army that staged a successful coup in 1965. He
changed the name to Zaïre, created a one-party state and lead the country
autocratically through decades of misrule and plunder (Mail and Guardian,
1999:10). Today (2000), with Kabila at the helm since 1997, the situation is to
a large extent still the same.
A host of parties are involved in the conflict in the DRC. This situation is not
only confusing, but it is also difficult to determine exactly who fights with and
against whom. On one side is President Laurent Kabila and his Congolese
Armed Forces supported by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan
and on the other side are the three main rebel groups and their sympathetic
supporters (Rwanda and Uganda). Two of the three rebel groups constitute
two separate wings of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which are
backed by Uganda and are lead respectively by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba
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and Emile Ilunga. The third rebel group is the Movements for the Liberation of
the Congo (MLC) lead by Jean-Pierre Bemba. In the midst of all these
conflicting parties are the UN, the OAU and the SAOC - all attempting to
deploy a UN peace mission. For the sake of clarity, this confusing concept is
represented graphically in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6: PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE DRC CONFLICT
DRC GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION
SYMPATHISERS
-The Congolese Rally for Democracy
wing backed by Rwanda
-The Congolese Rally for Democracy
wing backed by Uganda
-The Congo Liberation Movement
Pres. Laurent Kabila and the
Congolese Armed Forces
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Angola
Chad
Sudan
Uganda
Rwanda
SYMPATHISERS
Source: Compiled from media reports
On 10 July 1999 six regional countries and the Kabila regime signed the
Lusaka Peace Accord, which was mediated by Zambian President Frederick
Chiluba (SAPA-OPA-Reuters, 1999:8; De Coning, 1999:8). The rebel groups,
after much negotiation and mediation, signed only in August 1999.
The aim of this accord was to call a cease-fire after 13 months of civil war in
the ORC. The agreement allowed for, tt••• a cessation of hostilities within 24
hours of the signing of the agreement, a troop standstill, fol/owed by a
withdrawal of aI/ foreign forces" (De Coning, 1999,8). A cease-fire (as a
prerequisite) would have paved the way for a UN peacekeeping force to be
deployed. However, this never took place, because in early November 1999
renewed fighting between rebel forces and Kabila's troops broke out.
Although the cease-fire is still in force, the recent outbreak may derail the
fragile cease-fire and peace process pursued by the UN, OAU and SAOC.
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Another threat (if media reports prove to be accurate) is that Kabila has
ordered the UN monitoring group, MONUC, out of the country (SAPA-AFP-
Reuters, 1999:1-2; Reuters, 1999:9). This irresponsible act will inevitably
impede an already drawn-out process.
4.3.2 Overview of the Operational Mandate and Objectives
On 18 August 1998 the SADC mandated the intervention during a meeting of
SADC defence ministers in Harare (Malan, 1999c:92). Two different
mandates are evident: One is the SADC mandate to participating countries to
assist Kabila in restoring order; the second pertains to the UN and OAU to
monitor the situation and to confirm that a cease-fire has been established so
that a multinational peacekeeping force can be deployed.
Malan (1999c:92) points out that the SADC mandate was controversial
because of claims by President Robert Mugabe that all fourteen SADC
members 'unanimously' agreed to assist Kabila. President Mandela
subsequently reprimanded Mugabe for his "inflammatory talk" but later, to the
surprise of observers, Mandela announced that all SADC members support
the military intervention in the DRC. The reason for this turnabout is not
apparent. What is apparent is that Mugabe would have deployed his troops
even without South Africa's endorsement because, as Breytenbach et al. puts
it, "Zimbabwe has managed to wrangle important mineral extracting
concessions from the Kabila government ... Zimbabwe is seeing dollar signs.
Zimbabwean troops are merely the price" (1999:40). It can be assumed that
Kabila would have made similar deals with the other countries to secure their
support.
Another mandate that warrants mention is the formation of a Joint Military
Commission, which is tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the
implementation of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. In addition, an OAU
observer mission was also deployed in the DRC, and the UN has also
dispatched military liaison officers to the capitals of countries surrounding the
DRC (Wakabi et al., 1999:12).
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4.3.3 Comparison of the UN Principles with the Practices of the SADC
Forces
Although a UN peacekeeping force has not been deployed in the ORC, the
ongoing involvement of outsiders and the actions of the government army and
rebel forces warrants an analysed in terms of the UN principles.
4.3.3.1 Consent
Consent for the SADC's intervention, as has already been explained, is a
point of controversy. By virtue of Kabila's acceptance of the assistance
offered by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, it could be argued that consent
was obtained. Consent is, however, a much broader concept. For consent to
be in accordance with UN principles, it must be obtained from all parties to a
conflict. It is evident that the rebel forces never consented to the intervention,
apart from the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord. The signing of the peace
accord can be regarded as consent within an operation, as discussed in
Chapter 3. As such, it can be assumed that only partial consent was obtained
for the SAOC's intervention in the ORC.
4.3.3.2 Impartiality
The involvement by SAOC member states in the ORC should be viewed from
two angles mainly because the impartiality of the SAOC force has been a
bone of contention. One angle is the stance taken by the then South African
president, Nelson Mandela, and the other is the stance taken by the
Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe. Mandela espoused the need for
dialogue and a negotiated settlement, which would have supported the notion
of impartiality; the other is the option taken by Mugabe to intervene militarily in
support of Kabila. Soon afterwards, Angola and Namibia joined in to support
Zimbabwe. Since then, the civil war has been continuing for more than
thirteen months. Angola's involvement is based on the belief that Unita
guerillas operate against the government from bases in south-western Congo
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and on the fear of a pro-Unita regime in Kinshasa (Mail and Guardian,
1999:11).
Currently, a clear distinction can be made between forces in support of
Kabila's 'legitimate' regime and the forces that support the rebel groups (see
Figure 6). The mere fact that so many forces are involved in the ORC conflict
proves that none of the forces can claim entire impartiality.
4.3.3.3 TheUseof Force
There can be no doubt regarding the use of force by forces deployed in the
ORC. This can be proved mainly by the huge amounts spent on defence in
the Congolese war. Zimbabwe and the other supporters assisting Kabila
employed forceful measures right from the onset of this intervention. Media
reports have it that Zimbabwe, with a contingent of an estimated 11 000
troops, has incurred losses of R1, 7-billion worth of military equipment either
destroyed or captured by rebels. To date a total of 434 Zimbabwean soldiers
have died in the Congolese war (Mandizvidza, 1999:4). The Mail & Guardian
(12-18 November 1999) reports that, according to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies based in London, Kabila has spent $250 million on defence.
Kabila also has an estimated 56 000 troops compared with Uganda's 30 000
and Rwanda's 40 000.
4.3.4 Conclusion
For some time the area known as the Great Lakes region has been viewed as
a 'hot spot' on the African continent. The last decade of this century has seen
civil wars erupt in Burundi, Rwanda, the Central African Republic and Angola.
Some of these civil wars have a long-standing history that started long before
the dawn of the Nineties and are still continuing today. The ORC is no
exception, and the UN, OAU and the SAOC are closely monitoring the current
situation.
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The DRe conflict can be resolved only through dialogue with and the
commitment of all parties. In order for this to happen, a condition of peace
and trust must be created by preferably a neutral third party. The evident
mistrust among the signatories to the agreement, together with the need for
dialogue, makes the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission an urgent
priority. For the foreseeable future, at least, this seems to be an uncertain
possibility.
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CHAPTERS
TOWARDS A SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN CONFLICT-INTERVENTION
AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION MODEL
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, two cases were discussed where peacekeeping (measured in
terms of its 'classical' principles) proved to be irrelevant, undesirable and
unsuitable because of its limited application in intra-state conflict situations. If
it is thus argued that peacekeeping has limited applicability, what is the
correct approach? In answering this question, the aim of this chapter is to put
forward a dual-purpose model that can be used both as a framework for
conflict intervention (as an alternative to the 'classical' peacekeeping
paradigm) and as a critical measurement tool for the intervention phases of an
enforcement operation.
5.2 Conceptual ising the Proposed Model
The proposed model (Figure 7) is described as the 'Cyclic Conflict-
Intervention and Conflict-Resolution Model' in view of the nature of African
conflict, viz. the recurrent eruption into violence, which often results in the
horrors of gross human rights violations - even after peace agreements have
been signed. Moreover, the model proposes that the notion that the signing of
a peace agreement constitutes a resolution of conflict should be treated as a
misconception because, contrary to popular belief, conflict intervention can be
set into motion only after the paperwork has been completed. This has been
proved in the Great Lakes region in the case of Angola and the ORC, where
peace agreements have served as "a breathing gap" for conflicting parties to
plan yet another offensive (Powell, 1999:32). The proposed model also
suggests that all conflict situations are unique, and that mission success will
depend on the mandate and the objectives of an operation. The proposed
model was developed from a Sub-Saharan African perspective with a view to
applying it within a wider African, and even international, context. The
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intervention model proposed by this researcher by no means belies the notion
that all peaceful means must be resorted to in order to resolve conflict. It also
does not mean that the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 1 is negated in
favour of the forceful settlement of disputes. In this regard even Sir Brian
Urquhart, who contributed significantly to 'classical' peacekeeping; conceded
that the deployment of, "credible and effective peace enforcement
units...could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis"
(1998b:13).
The proposed model ultimately attempts to illustrate that if all else fails, this
may be one approach, based on humanitarian considerations, to resolving
recurrent and seemingly unresolved conflict situations. In this regard, and
with specific reference to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention versus
state sovereignty, Seymour (1996:2) is of the opinion that the plight of the
people caught in conflict situations should be of paramount concern. He puts
forward three critical factors that favour legitimised intervention above state
sovereignty, namely the:
• right of individuals to receive humanitarian assistance;
• right of international organisations (in certain instances) to gain access to
conflict-ridden areas in order to provide such assistance; and
• right and obligation of the international community to intervene in
widespread gross human rights violations.
Should the forceful (military) resolution of a conflict situation serve as the
ultimate solution, as recent incidents in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia have
proved, then it should at least be applied in accordance with some or other set
of guidelines and principles that will elicit what Seymour (1996:2) terms
'Tc]oherent and consistent responses". In this regard, the proposed model
accommodates the emerging regional security paradigm of, 'coalitions of the
willing and able' and is intended to fill a specific hiatus in the realm of conflict
resolution. It is also contended that Africans will have to take responsibility for
conflict prevention and resolution on their continent. The proposed model is
schematically represented in Figure 7.
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FIGURE 7: CYCLIC . CONFLICT-INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT-
RESOLUTION MODEL
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5.3 Model Phases
As can be concluded from Figure 7, the proposed model consists of three
distinct phases. The three phases constitute a pre-intervention phase, the
intervention per se and a post-intervention phase. Apart from these phases, a
number of actors, a process and a strategy are also distinguished. The
proper course of action is determined by the factors considered during the
pre-intervention phase of an operation. These factors include:
• the nature of the conflict;
• the requirements for successful engagement and exit;
• a decision on which actors are required for successfully resolving the
conflict;
• agreement on the mission objectives and mission success factors; and
• a decision on what processes and strategies to utilise;
The consideration of all these elements will make it possible to draw up an
intervention plan that is based on sound principles and objectives. This
consideration furthermore implies that the proposed model can be adapted to
the needs of the intervention force and to the mission objectives set by the
sanctioning authority. It is also assumed that the sanctioning authority will
meet all legal requirements in terms of intervention (Chapter VII UN mandate)
prior to deployment.
5.3.1 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 1
5.3.1.1 The Nature of the Conflict
African conflict situations are protracted, violent and costly and according to
De Coning (1999:3) "highly volatile" and in the foreseeable future will need a
"Chapter VII type peace enforcement mandate". The main causes of African
conflict can be attributed to intra-state tension and disputes between warring
factions which, in most instances, stem from age-old feuds, foreign interests,
ethnic divisions, arms smuggling, mercenary soldiering and from domestic
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and cross-border insurgencies. Clapham (1999:32) supports this view when
he writes that peacekeepers in Africa have been called upon to re-create
collapsing states; to intervene in vicious civil wars; and to negotiate and
enforce peace settlements among conflicting parties. Another cause is the
non-acceptance of borders set along geographical instead of ethnic lines by
colonial imperialists.
5.3.1.2 The Sanctioning Authority
Authorisation for an operation is a critical aspect of the legitimacy of such
operations (Hansen, 1999:5). The UN remains the principal sanctioning
authority for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. From a
regional perspective, the Sanctioning Authority may call upon the OAU as
regards a wider African context and upon the SADC as regards a regional
Southern African context. Both these organs may mandate regional missions
in order to resolve conflict situations and may ultimately establish peace
through achieving a political end-state. However, the UN should still sanction
all missions (see also Hansen, 1999:5 and Vogt, 1998:8). In this regard the
UN Charter (Chapter VIII, Article 53:1) specifically expresses the need for
regional arrangements and states that, " ...no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorisation of the Security Council... ". By its very nature, this is a
disputable clause as, firstly, it pertains to what Cilliers (1999:21) refers to as
"consensual peacekeeping". This type of peacekeeping applies to inter-state
conflict situations in which two opposing sides have agreed to a cease-fire
and have called upon the international community to intervene. Secondly, it is
a totally inadequate approach for dealing with current intra-state conflicts -
especially in the light of the evident reluctance of the UN to act. Finally, this
clause creates a dilemma, because the 'willing and able' participants in a
regional conflict situation may have to act swiftly and decisively (from a
humanitarian point of view), yet valuable time is initially lost while waiting for a
UN resolution to be passed and for a peacekeeping force to be deployed. All
these inadequacies result in a 'post facto authority syndrome' in which
authorisation is often granted only after a force has been deployed.
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Consequently, such authorisation amounts to nothing more than the
legitimisation of a peace mission, with an added flavour of enforcement. Of
late, this dilemma has evidently also been experienced at a micro-level:
countries act unilaterally and fail to obtain prior authorisation for deploying a
peace mission. The SADC intervention in Lesotho and the DRC are cases in
point.
What is evident, though, is that the SanctioningAuthority and the discretionary
powers bestowed upon it will remain a point of dispute if the current
manifestations of apparently underlying issues are not addressed urgently.
The UN needs to empower regional organs, such as the OAU and SADC, to
decide on deployment and engagement in crises-ridden volatile environments,
where humanitarian considerations are paramount. At the same time the
legality of such empowerment needs to be thrashed out. A grave concern for
the UN is the maintenance of its Chapter VIII mandate in order to prevent the
dilution of its constituted powers contained in the UN Charter.
A proposed solution to this dilemma is to establish a Permanent Peace
Secretariat within each regional security organ that will enhance the capacity
of such organs to deal with volatile situations (see Figure 7). Such a peace
secretariat will ultimately have to establish networks with other regional
organs and should be the co-ordinating centre for an early warning system.
The secretariat may be developed further as a regional-level mechanism that
has direct links with the UN Security Council. The advantages of a permanent
peace secretariat are that it will have a secretary-general and multi-national
staff. Continuity in its operations will be maintained and, at the same time, it
will provide regional organs with a mechanism for effective planning and
decision implementation. This mechanism will prevent individual countries
from acting unilaterally. The latter view is supported by Malan (1999c:92),
who warns that, "SADC leaders have proved willing to abuse the
Development Community to justify ad hoc military intervention in the affairs of
others". The establishment of a permanent peace secretariat may, however,
prove to be a pipe dream (at least in the short term), as the UN is not only
reluctant but also unwilling to relinquish any power that may jeopardise its
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'sole mandate' for international peace and security. In the view held by this
researcher, regional organs would consequently have to demonstrate their
commitment and take the initiative and responsibility for establishing such an
organ.
5.3.1.3 ThePartiesInvolved
In a conflict situation, two distinct parties can be distinguished. One is the
disputing parties who are responsible for any given conflict situation, and the
other includes those endeavouring to bring an end to hostilities and to
establish peace. In an intra-state conflict situation, the disputants usually
include warring parties, belligerents, rebellious factions, dissidents,
sympathisers and ethnic groups. Intra-state disputes may result from either
legitimate or illegitimate claims to territory, power and other perceived
entitlements. Such disputes may result in the taking up of arms and engaging
in war.
In the Great Lakes region, for example, sympathisers, such as Namibia,
Zimbabwe and Angola are taking sides with factions under the guise of
'peacekeeping forces', and their involvement serves only to complicate
matters. The effect of this 'outside' involvement in conflict situations is that
more parties have to be convinced to engage in peace talks, which tends to
drag out the peace-making process and reduces the chances of successfully
settling disputes. It may also be difficult to reach a cease-fire agreement in
situations where outsiders are involved, because the initial scope of the
problem is greatly increased.
The parties aiming to resolve such conflict include actors, such as:
• military and civilian observers;
• non-governmental organisation (NGOs);
• peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement contingents;
• politicians and diplomats; and
• special envoys representing regional and international organisations.
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5.3.1.4 The EarlyWarning System
An early warning system includes any mechanism, action or process designed
and established to share intelligence capabilities between regional and
international organisations. The definition offered by Anderlini and Nyheim
(1999:20) is, "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming
from areas of crises for the purposes of: (a) anticipating the escalation of
violent conflict; (b) development of strategic responses to these crises; and (c)
the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-
making". In the conflict arena, an early warning system has the potential of
preventing the loss of life and the destruction of property by virtue of the fact
that decisions to act can be made timeously. Shelton (1997:4) defines "early
warning" as, "lntormetion that can provide a timely alert to potential conflicts".
According to him, an early warning system should involve the synthesis of a
range of information inputs from various sources, including governments, non-
governmental organisations, and academic and research institutions.
However, the UN has not been able to establish an integrated intelligence
system. At present such a system (in the African context) exists only 'in
name' and resides under the Centre for Conflict Management of the OAU
(Cilliers, 1999:24). Anderlini and Nyheim (1999:21) hold the view that early
warning is about forecasting a potential crisis and set four criteria for its
success:
• Conflict early warning requires information concerning a wide range of
social, economic and political factors.
• It should be subjected to thorough and objective analysis as there is
always the danger that information may be interpreted biasedly to favour
the agenda and interests of certain groups.
• An appropriate response strategy needs to be established.
• Local and international players must be committed.
An early warning system may be perceived to be infringing on the sovereignty
of states and could be rejected as an interference in the domestic domain of
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states. In this regard, the current non-operability and effective 'absence' of an
early warning system may be viewed as a serious drawback for regional
security because of its potential to enhance the planning and execution of
interventionist operations or non-consensual peacekeeping.
5.3.1.5 Intervention Planning and Strategy
If a decision to intervene is made by the sanctioning authority, it signifies a
commitment to engagement in Phase 2. In order to provide a firm legal
foundation for intervention, a resolution will have to be passed by the
sanctioning authority to provide a proper mandate for the planned intervention
operation. Such a mandate can be regarded as the watershed between a
passive and an active operational mode. Forces with a predetermined
mandate will now be committed for inter-positioning in strategic areas.
Several steps precede intervention, and various actors and a strategy form
part of this phase. A most important consideration is the funding for the
operation. Peace enforcement operations have proved to be an extremely
costly and lengthy exercise. A recent example is the Lesotho intervention
(Operation BOLEAS), which amounted to R36-million over a one-year period.
Phase 2 will subsequently be discussed in greater detail.
Intervention planning is a task that requires, "a high degree of co-ordination
between various contributing nations and bodies" (Neethling 1999:2). It is
thus clear that such planning must be undertaken jointly, timeously and
meticulously by the organisation authorising the intervention. The planning
should be based on sound and verifiable information gathered through the
early warning system and other intelligence sources. Pre-intervention
planning tasks will have to be supported by techniques, such as geopolitical
scenario analysis, strategic and operational planning, logistical planning, force
level and force composition planning and command and control planning.
Another task before an intervention operation takes effect is the appreciation
of an intervention strategy. Owing to the unpredictability of peacekeeping
and peace enforcement operations, any intervention must be accompanied by
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clear entry and exit criteria, and mission success guidelines and objectives. A
sound intervention strategy and proper intervention planning will reduce risk-
taking and casualties, and will ensure a higher degree of success. The
success of a missionwill be determined by, among others, the
• ability of deployed forces to persevere under difficult and unfamiliar
circumstances;
• ability of the deployed forces to restrain themselves in the wake of an
armed onslaught; and
• ability of the deployed forces to unite in an effort to attain the mission
objective within the framework of the mandate.
5.3.2 Considerations Pertaining to Phase2
5.3.2.1 The Intervention Process
The intervention process consists of elements that are more appropriate for
'classical' peace enforcement operations. One such element is the
deployment of an intervention force in strategic areas. Such a force will have
to be of a multinational nature preferably committed by regional states
situated in close proximity to the conflict area to ensure rapid deployment and
unity of effort. A vital task of an intervention force will be to secure strategic
areas or 'hot spots' by forceful intervention in order to ensure that warring
parties are coerced to the negotiation table. Once this is achieved,
negotiations can begin, and all factions can form part of the signing of a
cessation of hostilities. Once a peace agreement has been brokered, warring
disputants can be disarmed and demobilised as a first step to restoring civil
authority and to achieving a political end-state.
5.3.2.2 The Intervention Force
In order to ensure legitimacy, the main requirement for an intervention force is
that it should be multinational. As already pointed out, no unilateral action by
individual states should be permitted. A pre-determined mandate must be
adhered to and should be strictly enforced. A requirement would be an
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accurate estimate of adequate force levels for deployment in order to prevent
a recurrence of a 'Lesotho'-type intervention in which an inadequate number
of troops was met with fierce resistance. Other considerations include joint
exercises to ensure interoperability of systems and procedures, a common
command and control plan and the use of an operational language
understood by all forces. Another important consideration is the conformity to
the principles guiding the conduct of parties entering into armed conflict. In
this regard, the international law concerning the conduct of hostilities (The
Hague and Geneva conventions) must be adhered to.
5.3.3 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 3
Phase 3 depends entirely on the outcome of the strategy and processes of
Phase 2. This implies that two distinct courses of action may be forthcoming.
One course of action depends on the successful resolution of the conflict, and
the second takes effect if the outcome is unsuccessful. Both phases may
prove to require a long process, depending upon the success or failure of the
intervention operation and the willingness of the disputants to cease
hostilities.
If it is assumed that the conflict situation has been satisfactorily resolved, an
environment conducive to post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives and the
implementation of an effective monitoring system is established. The
opportunity for a lasting peace agreement to be implemented would then have
been created. The establishment of lasting peace will inevitably create an
environment for a political end-state within which civil society may return to
'normal', and the intervention force can be withdrawn in accordance with a
pre-determined exit strategy.
Should this aforementioned scenario not be realised and depending on the
nature of the unresolved matters, the process may have to be referred back to
the sanctioning authority for a post mortem of the strategy and processes
employed in Phase 2. One course of action will be to call all the actors
together in order to re-negotiate a 'new' peace-agreement, to employ a 'new'
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strategy and process and to obtain and a 'new' intervention mandate based
on the outcome and findings of the post mortem. An analytical problem-
solving approach will be required for such an exercise.
For the purposes of clarity, elements of Phase 3 will be now be elaborated
upon.
5.3.3.1 Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Initiatives and Monitoring
According to Williams (1999:163) post-conflict peacebuilding is subject to
constant debate in the international academic community. The White Paper
on South African Participation in International Peace Mission (Republic of
South Africa, 1998:8) defines peacebuilding as, "activities such as the
identification and support of measures and structures which will promote
peace and build trust, and the facilitation of interaction of former enemies in
order to prevent a relapse into conflict". It furthermore regards peacebuilding
as critical in the aftermath of a conflict. In this regard Monnakgotla (1996:59)
writes that, "post-conflict peacebuilding ... will lay the foundation for longer
term stability and eradicate the conditions that originally caused the conflict".
A distinct characteristic of peacebuilding is the strong emphasis placed on
civil-military co-operation. In this respect, peacebuilding is used collectively to
define those activities aimed at restoring state structures in order for a state to
return to civilian rule after a period of conflict and war. The activities referred
to will include addressing issues, such as:
• fostering respect for human rights and political tolerance;
• building a state capacity and mechanisms for good governance;
• building and restoring a civil society capacity; and
• ensuring meaningful economic growth and development.
Linked to these activities are a long-term monitoring process and function that
needs to be performed by the sanctioning authority or a group designated for
this purpose.
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Haugerudbraaten (1998:24) distinguishes between two concepts of
peacebuilding, each with its own characteristic tendencies. The first concept
is the short-term involvement of the international community, whilst the
second concept relates to the long-term efforts by indigenous actors and
entails broad comprehensive efforts in the political, economic, humanitarian
and social spheres. In an African context, the latter tendency seems to be the
preferred course of action. The concepts and tendencies are reflected in
Figure 8 below.
FIGURE 8: PEACEBUILDING CONCEPTS AND TENDENCIES
Dimension Tendency 1 Tendency 2
Aim of peacekeeping Promotes good governance and Addresses root causes of
dispute settlement mechanisms conflict
Means of peacebuilding Primarily political intervention Broad intervention in political,
economic, security and
humanitarian spheres
Temporal aspects of Short-term Long-term
peacebuilding
Main actors of International community Indigenous actors
peacebuilding
Process/action dimension Peacebuilding equated to the Peacebuilding seen as the
actions undertaken result, as the aggregate process
Organisation of Peacebuilding is centralised Peacebuilding is facilitated by a
peacebuilding under the auspices of the UN, multitude of actors, greater
greater emphasis on co-ordination emphasis on diversity than on
than on diversity co-ordination
Source: Adapted from Haugerudbraaten (1998:24)
5.3.3.2 Failed Peace Agreements
Peace agreements - especially in African conflict situations - are not worth the
paper they are written on. For this reason, no guarantee exists that a peace
agreement will be permanent. Proof is to be found in countries, such as
Angola, Mozambique and, more recently, in the ORe, where initial peace
agreements have been violated by outbreaks of renewed war. It is therefore
contended that the planning and strategy for an intervention operation should
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
78
take cognisance of this probability. A host of factors may contribute to a failed
peace agreement. Among others, these include:
• a lack of commitment from disputants;
• a lack of understanding of the historic origin and the root causes of the
conflict;
• the unpredictability of the actions of conflicting parties;
• the lack of clarity of purpose, mandates and principles;
• the (often underestimated) influence exercised by disputants and
sympathisers;
• the lack of support from the local population;
• the difficulty in obtaining consent; and
• the perceived lack of legitimacy versus the sovereignty of the state.
5.3.3.3 Evaluation of the Strategy and Processes
A failure of Phase 2 (the during-intervention stage) calls for an evaluation of
the strategy and the processes and a 'lessons learnt approach'. The
sanctioning authority, in close collaboration with the force commanders and
planning staff, should do such an evaluation. A step-by-step scenario
analysis may reveal the weak links in the strategy and process, and corrective
measures should be instituted to eliminate the factors that gave rise to a failed
peace agreement. The strategy should also involve measures to prevent a
repetition of similar occurrences.
5.3.3.4 Re-negotiation of the Peace Agreement
To re-negotiate a failed peace agreement is easier said than done. Firstly, all
disputants must be summoned to a neutral venue to resume peace talks.
Secondly, neutral parties acceptable to all disputants must be found. A third
concern is the time factor, which may prove to be instrumental in maintaining
the momentum generated by initial peace agreements.
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5.4 Summary
The development of the model proposed in Figure 7 is rooted in the
assumption that the UN peacekeeping approach is not suited to the realities of
Sub-Saharan African conflict situations. It is these realities and the 'gray area'
experienced by peacekeepers involved in operations that force them to cross
the fine moral line between keeping peace and enforcing peace. In the wake
of escalating violence, recurrent regional civil wars and the unacceptable
levels of cruelty against humanity, a comprehensive response by regional
organs is needed to deal with the appropriately dubbed 'paralysing paradox' of
countries willing, but unable, and those able, but unwilling. In the absence of
such a response, the proposed model attempts to fill this hiatus by suggesting
a remedy to current unacceptable practices.
Figure 9 contains a summary of the distinguishing characteristics of the
proposed model compared with current realities.
FIGURE 9: DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPOSED
MODEL COMPARED WITH CURRENT REALITIES
PROPOSED MODEL CURRENT REALITIES
Peace enforcement Disguised peacekeeping
Holistic approach Uncoordinated approach
Sanctioned and mutually funded Unsanctioned and self-funded operations
operations
Clear strategy, mandates and procedures Ambiguous strategy, non-existent
mandates and unclear procedures
Multinational approach Unilateral approach
Operational permanent peace secretariat Non-operational peace and security
and early warning systems structures
Legitimate regional imperatives National interests
Source: Compiled from research results
In view of the comparative distinguishing characteristics mentioned above, the
proposed model aims to serve as a framework for the following:
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• a holistic approach to intra-state conflict situations that employs a variety
of role-players including among others, the military, civilian organisations,
external and internal observers, politicians and diplomats;
• the establishment of a permanent peace secretariat and a comprehensive
and operational early warning mechanism with all its potential benefits for
the successful resolution of conflict;
• proper authorisation and funding of an intervention operation. For this
purpose, strong emphasis is placed on the role of the Sanctioning
Authority and its mandating responsibility. The case studies (Chapter 4)
have exposed the disregard for the sanctioning authority and in this
context, the model aims to prevent the unilateral deployment of forces
without a sanctioned mandate under the pretext of peacekeeping;
• a clear intervention strategy, comprising sound operational objectives that
are free from bias and national interests, pre-determined mission success
factors and mutually agreed upon entry and exit criteria; and
• genuine efforts to establish a lasting peace agreement. Such efforts
should be linked to the introduction of post-conflict peacebuilding
initiatives, coupled with an effective monitoring mechanism.
The proposed model should not be regarded as a quick fix for conflict
resolution and is by no means the ultimate approach to an intricate and
problematic phenomenon. The value of the proposed model lies in its
potential to provide policy guidelines for future interventionist operations that
will prevent unacceptable practices from being performed under the pretext of
peacekeeping. It is hoped that the proposed model will initiate not only a
doctrinal debate on regional conflict resolution, but that it will actually
contribute to the search for a policy solution to a serious and destructive
regional security dilemma.
5.5 Conclusion
The model proposed in Figure 7 was developed as a result of an absence of a
suitable alternative to resolving the current situation. In this regard, the
proposed model serves to provide a remedy for intractable regional conflict.
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As can be observed from the preceding chapters, peacekeeping has
admittedly undergone major changes regarding its interpretation and
implementation in especially Sub-Saharan African conflict situations. On the
one hand, the UN Charter serves as the guiding policy document; on the other
hand, there are the realities of 'modern' African intra-state and inter-state
conflict. The assumption is thus made that the policies intended for
implementation and those that are ultimately implemented differ widely. It has
become a serious imperative to remedy this state of affairs in the Sub-
Saharan African region.
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CHAPTER6
SYNTHESIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the research paper will be concluded with closing remarks on
all the issues addressed in the preceding chapters. To accomplish this, the
aim of this chapter is to:
• revisit the problem statement and the research hypothesis formulated in
Chapter 1;
• achieve a synthesis of the main themes;
• make recommendations based on the research findings;
• put forward proposals for future research; and to
• draw final conclusions regarding the research.
6.2 Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis
It is the view of the researcher that the research conducted in this paper
conclusively validates the research hypothesis formulated in Chapter 1. It is
therefore contended that:
• the current Sub-Saharan African practice as regards the resolution of
conflict is inconsistent with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent,
impartiality, and the absence of force; and that
• the practices of Sub-Saharan African countries in conflict situations often
contribute to a deterioration of conflict situations.
In both case studies (Republic of Lesotho and the ORC), the non- compliance
or partial compliance with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent,
impartiality and the absence of force to deal with intra-state and inter-state
conflict have done serious damage to the capacity of regional organs to
address and resolve conflict issues. Where enforcement action was used, it
lacked a mandate and a consistent approach.
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6.3 Synthesis
The researcher set out to study the phenomenon of peacekeeping from a
Sub-Saharan African perspective. Chapter 1 provided a general overview of
concepts and explains the research methodology used in the research. The
selection of an appropriate approach to the study is the objective of Chapter 2.
A comparative policy content analysis was found to be the best approach to
deal with the concept of peacekeeping. Chapter 3 is the most comprehensive
chapter, since the concept of peacekeeping is explained, reviewed and
compared in terms of its 'classical' meaning and the 'modern' approaches
evident in current practices. The comparative policy content approach proved
to be a useful tool in this regard, as some interesting conclusions regarding
peacekeeping can be drawn from the findings in this particular chapter. Two
case studies (Lesotho and the ORC) are provided in Chapter 4 in order to
comparatively measure peacekeeping practice with the theoretical foundation
espoused in Chapter 3.
The research project has three overall objectives to satisfy. One of these is
an evaluation of the evolution, principles and characteristics of peacekeeping
and the conditions resulting in the need for peacekeeping. The second
objective is to compare the various concepts, contentions and views of
numerous writers on the subject of peacekeeping. A third objective is to
propose a model for intervention in conflict situations together with a broad
description of the elements, actors, conditions and requirements for conflict
intervention and the resolution thereof.
It is the contention of this researcher that all the abovementioned objectives
have been achieved satisfactorily, and based on these, the ensuing
recommendations are put forward.
6.4 Recommendations based on the research findings
The view held by this researcher is that all research should contribute to an
existing body of knowledge, by either supporting the findings of previous
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research or by producing new thought-provoking data that challenges existing
paradigms. The proposed model expounded in Chapter 5 asserts the latter.
In this regard, the following recommendations are made:
• Peacekeeping should be regarded as the ultimate approach to resolving
conflict and, as such, it should be applied only when conditions are
favourable enough for it to be firmly embedded in the 'classical' UN
principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force.
• Security organs, such as the UN, the OAU and the SADC should not view
peace enforcement as a threat to peacekeeping. It should preferably be
viewed as an alternative approach to situations where it is evident that
peacekeeping will not succeed.
• International organisations dealing with peace and security should renew
their commitment towards the resolution of conflict on the African
continent.
• The UN Security Council needs to shift its peacekeeping paradigm by
reviewing its commitment to global peace and security.
• Peace initiatives should address the root causes and not the symptoms of
conflict.
• The financing of peacekeeping operations should remain the responsibility
of the UN Security Council to ensure compliance by regional organs.
• Sub-Saharan Africa should rely on its own strengths to deal with conflict
prevention and resolution through enhancing the capacity of regional
organs and by obtaining the assistance of international bodies.
• The conduct of conflict management operations should be sanctioned (in
all instances) by a regional body in accordance with the UN Security
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Council and should be approached from a holistic perspective with the aid
of a comprehensive early warning system and policy framework in order to
prevent inconsistent conduct.
• Sub-Saharan African countries should foster a greater respect for human
rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and political tolerance.
• Peace and stability should be regarded as a regional imperative that
require commitment from all regional role-players.
6.5 Recommendations for future research
Owing to the limited scope of this research project, certain issues could not be
addressed. In this regard, the following recommendations are made that aim
to augment the content of this text.
• With the development of peacekeeping to beyond the mere monitoring of
cease-fires, a need exists for a comprehensive approach that addresses
the entire 'modern' peacekeeping dimension. It is thus recommended that
research be conducted to establish what the constituents should be for
such a multidimensional peacekeeping approach.
• The research revealed that tension exists in the SAOGbetween especially
South Africa and Zimbabwe. It was also observed that the SAOG was
established on the concept of regional economic co-operation. If it is
conceded that the SAOG will play a leading role in the resolution of
regional conflict, it stands to reason that better political co-operation will be
a prerequisite for a co-ordinated effort to resolve regional security matters
and for ensuring continued support from the UN. In this regard, studies
need to be conducted to establish:
What factors are responsible for the tension among members of the
SAOG Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and how it can be
resolved.
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- What measures need to be taken to enhance regional political co-
operation.
- Whether a 'new' SADC organisation (similar to the UN Security
Council), to deal specifically with regional security, needs to be
established under UN guidance.
6.6 Conclusions
The greatest challenge for Africa in general, but more specifically Sub-
Saharan Africa, is to find lasting solutions to the intractable conflict that has
prevented this continent from developing to its full potential. Decades of
efforts to resolve Africa's problems through peaceful means have resulted in
little progress towards a sustainable solution. This can be ascribed partially to
the historical origin and imperialistic influences and partially to age-old feuds
and ethnic intolerances that still dictate relations between Africa's nations.
The research has demonstrated that conflict originating from within states
cannot be dealt with with mechanisms designed for conflict between states.
In recent times, Africa, as arguably the greatest proponent of intra-state
conflict and tension, has put a number of 'home-made' mechanisms to the test
in an attempt to solve its own problems. These mechanisms have resulted in
not only tension and disagreement with the UN, but have also proved to be
inadequate and to lack a holistic approach.
The research has indicated that the UN's reluctance to become involved in
Africa has left regional organs to grapple with security matters themselves,
while lacking clear guidelines, receiving limited support and being subject to
rife criticism from the UN.
The research has also found that, apart from the political dimension, conflict
also profoundly influences the economic, social, institutional and humanitarian
dimensions of states and nations. The fact that peacekeeping principles are
not being adhered to, is a clear signal that they need to be re-evaluated from
an African perspective. Peacekeeping, as it is envisaged by the UN and as it
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is stated in the hypothesis, does not work in Africa and the research has
endeavored to validate this notion through a comparative study of 'classical'
UN principles and the 'modern' manifestation of peace initiatives. Also
evident, is that no substitute exists - beyond the western peacekeeping
paradigm - that meets all the 'classical' peacekeeping criteria.
The research has also shown that the disengagement of the Western Powers
is another problem in need of a solution. For Sub-Saharan Africa to deal
effectively with intra-state conflict, a balance will have to be struck between
the ability of the willing and the capacity of the able. The lack of financial
resources experienced by regional organs is yet another drawback as Sub-
Saharan Africa searches for answers to address conflict beyond the year
2000. Mere capacity building, the latest trend in Western involvement, fall
short of providing a sustainable solution.
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